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THE LEVEL PLAYING FIELD
Constantine N. Katsoris*
I. Introduction
It was the best of times, it was the worst of times, it was the age of
wisdom, it was the age of foolishness, it was the epoch of belief, it
was the epoch of incredulity, it was the season of Light, it was the
season of Darkness, it was the spring of hope, it was the winter of
despair, we have everything before us, we have nothing before us
.... It was the year of Our Lord one thousand seven hundred and
seventy-five.'
Similarly, the years 1987-1989 (hereinafter the "Dickens years" or
"Dickens period") could be described as among the best and the
worst of times for the securities industry. During this period the Dow
Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) pierced two historical highs,2 only
to be followed by one day declines of unprecedented proportions.3 On
October 19, 1987 ("Black Monday"), the Dow plunged 508 points
(22.6%) in one trading day,4 and two years later, after a dramatic
comeback to a new high in 1989, this key indicator again suffered a
one-day decline of 190.58 points (6.91%) on October 13, 1989
("Bloody Friday"). 5
This feverish volatility has been attributed to many reasons, includ-
ing program trading6 and excessively leveraged buyouts.7 Other con-
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versity; J.D. 1957, Fordham University School of Law; LL.M. 1963, New York Univer-
sity School of Law; Public Member of Securities Industry Conference on Arbitration
since its inception in 1977; Public Member of National Arbitration Committee of the
National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD), 1975-1981; Public Arbitrator at New
York Stock Exchange (NYSE) since 1971; Public Arbitrator at NASD since 1968; Arbi-
trator for First Judicial Department in New York since 1972; Private Judge, Duke Law
School's Private Adjudication Center since 1989.
1. C. DICKENS, A TALE OF Two CITIES (Washington Square Press ed. 1957).
2. See Small Investors Tiptoe Back to Wall St., Bus. WK., Aug. 14, 1989, at 99;
October Rerun?, Wall St. J., Oct. 16, 1989, at 1, col. 6 [hereinafter October Rerun?].
3. See Welcome Back To The Wall Street Funhouse, Bus. WK., Oct. 30, 1989, at 27.
4. Id.
5. October Rerun?, supra note 2. Of equal significance was the speed of the decline.
The DJIA dropped 154 points in only 65 minutes, pausing only as the market close
neared. Id.
6. See A Pox on Program Traders, Barron's, Oct. 30, 1989, at 6, col. 1; Is Program
Trading a Threat Again?, U.S. News & World Rep., Sept. 18, 1989, at 76; Programmed
For Trouble?, Financial World, Nov. 28, 1989, at 108. But see Don't Shoot the Computer,
The Economist, Nov. 11, 1989, at 16. For a concise discussion of program trading, see
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tributing causes have been interest rates, a fluctuating dollar, the
lingering trade deficit and the persistent national budget deficit.8 Un-
derstandably, much confusion abounds, and unfortunately, precious
Ball, "The Stand We Took Against Program Trading Two Years Ago Still Stands," (Ad-
vertisement from the Wall Street Journal), reprinted in Prudential Bache Securities
Marketwise at 2 (Dec. 1989). Ball writes:
Program trading explained
Program trading or stock-index arbitrage became possible when, in 1982, fu-
tures indexes were introduced into the market through the commodities ex-
change. The futures index was intended to be a useful vehicle for hedging
against market risk. Under normal market conditions, portfolio managers
could reduce their exposure to stock price movement by selling index futures
and locking in a reasonable profit.
In theory, reducing the risk would encourage stock purchases, which would
enhance capital formation, which would enable new companies to form and
older ones to re-form, which would promote a healthy economy. Sounds won-
derful, doesn't it?
What actually happens is that every so often a discrepancy develops between
the current price and the price offered on a futures contract. Traders can pro-
gram computers to spot those discrepancies-buying the one that's cheaper and
selling the one that's more expensive. By playing the spread, portfolio manag-
ers can profit without making any judgment on the quality of the stocks being
brought and sold. And keep in mind: with computers you hit a few keys,
and-zap--you've fired hundreds of orders through the wires. Excessive vola-
tility can then result, as the stock market becomes driven by the commodities
market. In other words, the primary market has become the derivative. The
futures tail is wagging the stock market dog....
The concern here is that, from time to time, the two markets once linked feed
on each other independent of fundamental economic values. Volatility is in-
duced by the mindless activity of the market trading on the market, rather thai
on the inherent value -of the stock. Program trading, thus, replaces sound
human judgment with a machine that scans numbers and plays a spread. This
creates distortions reflecting neither good business nor economic values.
It also diminishes the confidence of the individual investor. And, please, do
not undereitimate the place of the individual investor. In aggregate they are a
powerful force in the market. More importantly, take away participation
through individual judgment and you begin to unravel the fabric of our society.
Id.; see also Brady Backs SEC's Bid for More Power Over Index Futures, Wall St. J., Mar.
12, 1990, at C13, col. 3; Measure Giving the SEC Power to Curb Program Trades Is Voted
by House Panel, Wall St. J., Mar. 13, 1990, at C9, col. 1.
7. See Watch Dog Awake!, Barron's, Nov. 13, 1989, at 6, col. 1; The Loud Clank of
Junk, Newsweek, Sept. 25, 1989, at 32, col. 1; LBO Stakes Benefit Pension Funds, Study
Concludes, Wall St. J., Dec. 18, 1989, at B 5C, col. 4. "In a leveraged buy-out, a group of
investors acquires a company in a transaction financed largely with borrowing. Ulti-
mately, the debt is paid with funds generated by the acquired company's operations or
the sale of its assets." Id.; see also The LBO Isn't A Superior New Species, Bus. WK., Oct.
23, 1989, at 126.
8. See The Quiet Crusader, Bus. WK. Sept. 18, 1989, at 80; US. Should Reduce Its
Budget Deficit And Alter Tax Structure, OECD Says, Wall St. J., Nov. 27, 1989, at A2,
col. 3; GNP Upgrading Seen But Coming Data Expected To Signal Still Weak Future,
Wall St. j., Nov. 27, 1989, at A2, col. 3; Week In Business, The Trade Deficit Takes Off
Again, N.Y. Times, Dec. 17, 1989, § 3 (Business), at 14, col. 1.
SECURITIES ARBITRATION
little has been done to temper this plague of extreme volatility.9
Regardless of the causes, however, this volatility has become a fact
of life resulting in enormous profits for some and enormous losses for
others. One outgrowth of these losses is the explosion of litigation
between the individual investors and the securities industry:' 0 the for-
mer usually seeks recoupment of losses, and the latter often seeks to
collect on the debit balances when sudden market gyrations wipe
away the equity in many margin accounts. Not only has the amount
of litigation mushroomed, but the disputes have become significantly
more complex."
During the Dickens years, the forum for the resolution of these dis-
putes has shifted from the courtroom to arbitration. 2 This dramatic
switch is largely the result of the United States Supreme Court opin-
ions in Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon "3 and Rodri-
quez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express Inc. ,14 which basically
held that cases arising under the federal securities laws were
arbitrable. 15
Arbitration provides the advantage of speedy dispute resolution by
persons knowledgeable in the area, without excessive costs.' 6 Unless
arbitration procedures are fair in fact and appearance, however, their
present popularity as a means of resolving securities disputes will
greatly diminish. 7 In this regard, the public perception of fairness
must be zealously guarded, for it extends far beyond the issue of arbi-
tration. Indeed, it goes to the very heart of the public investors' trust
in the securities markets themselves, and it is this trust which must be
preserved for those very markets to remain healthy.'8
9. See Wall Street Puts Futility Index at High, Wall St. J., Oct. 19, 1989, at CI, col.
3; Down With Program Trading, Daily News, Oct. 22, 1989, at 8, col. 1; see also People
Invest Little Faith in Wall Street, Wall St. J., Sept. 25, 1989, § 2, at 1, col. 3.
10. The Security Regulatory Organizations (SROs) arbitration forums have exper-
ienced a manyfold increase recently in the number of claims filed each year. See infra at
483 (Appendix A).
11. See infra notes 328-33 and accompanying text.
12. Katsoris, Securities Arbitration After McMahon, 16 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 361,
368-89 (1988) [hereinafter Katsoris I]; Arbitration and Recent Rule Changes, N.Y.L.J.,
July 27, 1989, at 3, col. 3.
13. 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
14. 109 S. Ct. 1917 (1989).
15. See infra notes 46-49 and accompanying text.
16. See Katsoris, The Arbitration of a Public Securities Dispute, 53 FORDHAM L.
REV. 279 [hereinafter Katsoris II].
17. See Katsoris II, supra note 16, at 310; see generally Serota, The Unjustified Furor
Over Securities Arbitration, 16 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 105 (1989).
18. See Katsoris, The Double Jeopardy of Corporate Profits, 29 BUFFALO L. REV. 1,
13-26.
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In Part II this Article traces the origin of arbitration and examines
the shift in the resolution of securities disputes from the courtroom to
arbitration. The remaining sections deal with the issues of creating
and maintaining a "level playing field," i.e., ensuring that the resolu-
tion of securities disputes are conducted in a manner that is fair to
both investors and the securities industry. In shaping such a field,
inquiry must be made concerning the rules governing the arbitration
procedure, the arbitrators who preside over and decide the matters in
controversy, and the forum where the matter will be heard.
Part III traces the evolution and discusses the present form of the
Uniform Code of Arbitration, the body of rules which governs Secur-
ity Regulatory Organization (SRO) arbitration. Part IV discusses the
profile and conduct of the arbitrators who will decide the cases. Part
V discusses the forum that would best achieve the goal of a level play-
ing field. In seeking to create this level playing field, however, we
must also be careful that partisan politics do not tilt the field in such a
manner which would prevent "the greater good from being recog-
nized," 19 i.e., a fair system for all. With this goal in mind, the Article
concludes with certain recommendations and suggestions2" which go
beyond the ambit of, and yet directly or indirectly affect securities
arbitration.
II. Background of Securities Arbitration
Arbitration is hardly a modern day phenomenon. It was Aristotle
who wrote:
[e]quity is justice in that it goes beyond the written law. And it is
equitable to prefer arbitration to the law court, for the arbitrator
keeps equity in view, whereas the judge looks only to the law, and
the reason why arbitrators were appointed was that equity might
prevail.2
The arbitration of securities disputes can be traced back to the New
York Stock Exchange (NYSE) in 1872.22 Since that time, numerous
other SROs have established arbitration programs for the settlement
of such disputes.23
19. Hoblin, The Case For a Single Securities and Commodities Arbitration Forum,
COMMODITIES L. LETTER 3, 5 (Aug. 1989) [hereinafter Hoblin I].
20. For a discussion of these suggestions, see infra notes 419-46 and accompanying
text.
21. THE ARBITRATOR'S MANUAL i; see infra notes 335-36 and accompanying text.
22. P. HOBLIN, SECURITIES ARBITRATION: PROCEDURES, STRATEGIES, CASES 1-2
(1988) (hereinafter HOBLIN II).
23. Id.
[Vol. XVII
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To fully understand the present rules governing arbitrations at SRO
forums, and elsewhere, we must look to the development of the pres-
ent system. We must explore the judicial developments that have
largely channeled such disputes into arbitration.24 We must also ex-
amine legislative attempts to alter or influence the area of securities
arbitration." Finally, we must look to the establishment and work of
the Securities Industry Conference on Arbitration (SICA) and the
oversight role of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC or
Commission).2 6
A. Judicial Development
An unresolved dispute between an investor and his broker ordina-
rily ends in arbitration because of an arbitration agreement executed
at the time a customer opens an account with his broker.27 Indeed, a
persistent complaint is that the public investor is often forced, when
opening a securities account with a broker, to sign an agreement to
arbitrate future disputes.2"
24. See infra notes 27-49 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 52-78 and accompanying text.
27. SROs require by rule that their membership consent to arbitrate disputes with
their customers. By belonging to the SRO, its members agree to be bound by the SRO's
rules. Consequently, customers of an SRO may compel a member of an SRO to arbitrate;
however, absent a written contract, the member cannot compel the customer to arbitrate.
See HOBLIN II, supra note 22, at 2-3 to 2-4. The standard arbitration clause "authorizes
the customer to elect the arbitration forum from a list of several organizations. If the
customer does not elect the forum within five days after receipt from the broker-dealer of
a notification requesting such election, the broker-dealer becomes authorized to make the
election." Exchange Act Release No. 15,984 n.4 (July 2, 1979), reprinted in 17 SEC
Docket 1167, 1169 n.4 (June-Aug. 1979). The extent to which customers are, as a practi-
cal matter, "required" to sign what can basically be described as a typical industry-wide
agreement containing a pre-dispute arbitration clause is a critical question. This is partic-
ularly so if "the customer may be precluded from doing business with the broker-dealer if
he or she refuses to sign the agreement or the broker-dealer is unwilling to accept any
modification of its terms." Id. at 1169. It would appear that such agreements are largely
in effect with respect to margin, option and commodity accounts, and, to a lesser degree,
cash accounts. See Stansbury & Klein, The Arbitration of Investor-Broker Disputes: A
Summary of Development, 35 ARB. J. 30, 32 (1980); see also C. FLETCHER, DYNAMISM
IN SECURITIES ARBITRATION, SECURITIES ARBITRATION PRACTICE AND PROCEDURES
SEMINAR 14 (Nov. 17, 1989). A "1988 SEC study of 65 brokerage firms showed that
61 % of all cash accounts had no arbitration agreement in effect; 6% of margin accounts
had no arbitration agreement; and, 5% of option accounts had no arbitration agree-
ment." Id. This difference probably stems from the fact that the latter two usually in-
volve greater risk or an extension of some form of credit by the firm to the customer, thus
increasing the need for speedy resolution of problems through arbitration.
28. Although some courts have recognized the issue of adhesion, it would appear that
most courts do not consider it to be a problem in the case of securities arbitration clauses.
See Katsoris I, supra note 12, at 373-74; see also Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc., 28 Cal. 3d
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Under the United States Arbitration Act (Federal Arbitration Act
or Arbitration Act),29 agreements to arbitrate future disputes are, in
general, specifically enforceable.3 ° In the pre-Dickens period, how-
ever, there was an exception recognized for customers' claims which
arose under the Securities Act of 193331 (1933 Act or Securities
Act).32 This exception resulted from the Supreme Court's decision in
807, 623 P.2d 165, 171 Cal. Rptr. 604 (1981); Hope v. Superior Court of Santa Clara
County, 122 Cal. App. 3d 147, 175 Cal. Rptr. 851 (1981). Adhesion arises when a stan-
dardized contract, usually drafted by a party of superior bargaining power, is presented
to a party whose choice is limited to accepting or rejecting the contract without the op-
portunity to negotiate its terms. Such agreements are usually used when a party enters
into similar transactions with many individuals, and the agreements resemble ultimatums
or laws rather than mutually negotiated contracts. See J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO,
CONTRACTS §§ 9-41 to 9-46 (3d ed. 1987). As to the enforceability of such contracts
generally, see Katsoris II, supra note 16, at 306-09.
SICA had never specifically addressed the issue of pre-dispute arbitration agreements
in depth because many of the SRO members believed that such agreements were private
contractual issues between the customer and the broker. Nevertheless, this author re-
peatedly expressed concern about the voluntariness of the arbitration agreement before
McMahon. Id. The issue should be examined, however, because it strikes at the very
heart of the public's overall perception as to the fairness of the arbitration process. Inves-
tors should not be forced to agree to a pre-dispute arbitration agreement as a condition to
access to the securities markets. See supra note 27. Such an agreement should be entered
into freely, and only after the full effect and meaning of such a clause is disclosed. After
McMahon, SICA did consider the form of such agreement. See infra notes 261-68; see
also infra notes 264-65, regarding separate initialling. Moreover, such informed consent
would eliminate a troublesome issue that often arises, concerning whether a customer
understood or even read the arbitration clause. Although it may presently be the case
that the public investor does have a choice-particularly with respect to cash accounts
(see supra note 27)-such de facto coercion may someday become the case. See Katsoris
I, supra note 12, at 375. In that event, Congress should insist upon market access with-
out executing a pre-dispute arbitration clause. Id.
If, however, a customer does freely execute a pre-dispute arbitration agreement, that
agreement should thereafter be binding, particularly since the industry is generally auto-
matically bound to arbitrate. See HOBLIN II, supra note 22, at 2-3 to 2-4. To hold other-
wise would make a mockery of the law of contracts. On the other hand, if the industry
insists upon loading such agreements with choice of law provisions or other restrictions
(i.e., the inclusion of a provision expressly prohibiting punitive damages) which would
prevent relief otherwise available in court, then the issue of adhesion should be re-ex-
amined by the courts. See infra notes 245-48, 266 and accompanying text.
29. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1982).
30. Section 2 of the Arbitration Act provides: "[a] written provision in ... a contract
evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration, a controversy there-
after arising out of such contract . . . shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save
upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." Id. § 2
(emphasis added). Because the Federal Arbitration Act applies to claims arising from
transactions involving interstate commerce, id., and because securities dealings usually
involve such transactions, state securities claims, as well as those arising under the federal
securities laws, are usually arbitrable.
31. 15 U.S.C. § 77 (1982).
32. See Katsoris II, supra note 16, at 293-95.
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1953 in Wilko v. Swan,33 in which the Court had to decide between
the mandate of the Arbitration Act to arbitrate and provisions in the
Securities Act intended to protect the customer's rights.34 In essence,
the Wilko Court resolved this conflict between the Arbitration Act
and the Securities Act in favor of the latter by concluding that Con-
gress' desire to protect investors would be more effectively served by
holding unenforceable any pre-dispute arbitration agreements relating
to issues arising under the 1933 Act.35 Prior to 1987, most federal
courts presumed that the Wilko prohibition also extended to the Se-
curities Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act or Exchange Act),3 6 and
thus--despite pre-dispute arbitration agreements-refused to order
arbitration for customers' claims arising under the 1934 Act.37
The confusion regarding the Wilko extension to claims under the
1934 Act was further exacerbated when a public customer joined a
non-arbitrable Wilko federal claim with an arbitrable non-federal se-
curities claim. Some courts bifurcated the two and ordered that the
federal Wilko claim be litigated, and the other claim be arbitrated.
Other courts, however, found the two claims to be so inteitwined that
it was impractical or impossible to separate them, and therefore, or-
dered that both be litigated together.38
The intertwining/bifurcation issue, however, was settled in 1985 in
Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd.39  Byrd raised two issues: first,
whether Wilko extends to 1934 Act claims; and second, whether the
federal and non-federal claims should be bifurcated or, if intertwined,
tried together.40 Although the Court declined to specifically resolve
the issue of whether Wilko applied to 1934 Act claims,4' the Court
33. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
34. Id. The Court noted that the Securities Act was, designed to protect investors
from fraud by requiring full disclosure on the part of the dealer. Id. In order to effect this
policy, Congress included three special provisions in the 1933 Act. Section 12 specifically
gave investors a special right to recover for misrepresentation which differs substantially
from the common-law action in that this special right imposes upon the seller the burden
of proving lack of scienter. Id.; 48 Stat. 84 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 771
(1982)). Under § 14 of the Act, 48 Stat. 84 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77n (1982)), an
investor could not waive this special right. Finally, § 22 of the Act specifically affords the
plaintiff national service of process and a broad choice of forum by making the right
enforceable by the investor in any court of competent jurisdiction, federal or state. 48
Stat. 86 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) (1982)).
35. 346 U.S. at 432.
36. 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1982).
37. See Katsoris I, supra note 12, at 364-67.
38. 346 U.S. 366 (1953).
39. 470 U.S. 213 (1985).
40. Id. at 214-15.
41. Id. at 214 n. 1. The Court declined to resolve this issue because Dean Witter
1990]
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did hold that when an arbitrable claim is joined with a non-arbitrable
Wilko claim, the claims need not be tried together involuntarily.42
Thus, Byrd rejected the concept of "intertwining" and supported the
principle of automatic bifurcation, whenever a non-arbitrable Wilko
claim is joined with an arbitrable claim.43 In other words, the two
claims may be tried separately and simultaneously." Whatever the
merits of automatic bifurcation, it would unleash and set in motion
two separate forums on a collision course.4"
In 1987, the Supreme Court in Shearson/American Express, Inc. v.
McMahon 46 resolved the question left unanswered in Byrd, by hold-
ing that the Wilko exemption did not apply to 1934 Act claims. Fi-
nally, in 1989 the Supreme Court in Rodriquez de Quijas v. Shearson!
American Express47 undid the Wilko exception entirely and held that
pre-dispute arbitration agreements would be upheld, even as to issues
arising under the 1933 Act.48 Because of the McMahon and Rodri-
guez decisions, most securities disputes are now arbitrated pursuant to
pre-dispute arbitration agreements.49
That has not ended the story, however. In the aftermath of the
MeMahon decision, both Congress and the legislatures of several
states made attempts to render pre-dispute securities arbitration
agreements unenforceable.50 To date, such efforts have proven
Reynolds, Inc., did not seek to compel arbitration of the federal securities claims at the
district court level. Id.
42. Id. at 217.
43. Id.; see also Katsoris I, supra note 12, at 366-67.
44. 470 U.S. at 217; see First Step To Heighten Role of Arbitration, Legal Times,
March 11, 1985, at 5, col. 1.
45. See Katsoris, The Securities Arbitrators' Nightmare, 14 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 3, 8
(1985-86) [hereinafter Katsoris III]. The essence of the problem is that two separate
forums would often be ruling essentially on the same set of facts with the possibility of
contradictory findings. Id. at 9-11.
46. 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
47. 109 S. Ct. 1917 (1989).
48. Id. at 1922; see Arbitration and the Demise of Wilko v. Swan, N.Y.L.J., June 15,
1989, at 3, col 3.
49. SIXTH REPORT OF THE SECURITIES INDUSTRY CONFERENCE ON ARBITRATION
1 (Aug. 1989) [hereinafter SIXTH REPORT] (available at Fordham Urban Law Journal
office).
50. See Draft Bill To Restrict Use of Pre-Dispute Agreements, 1 SEC. ARB. COMMEN-
TATOR 3, 4 (June 1988); Markey to SEC: What Happened?, 1 SEC. ARB. COMMENTATOR
4, 1 (July 1988); State Actions on Pre-Dispute Clauses, 1 SEC. ARB. COMMENTATOR 9
(Aug. 1988).
A particularly serious attempt by a state to regulate arbitration agreements was that
undertaken by Massachusetts. See Neeseman, After McMahon and Rodriquez: The
State of the Law, SEC. ARB. 217, 279.3 (1989). The Massachusetts rule bars licensed
broker-dealers from requiring investors to sign pre-dispute arbitration agreements, and
mandates that brokers must disclose fully to investors the legal effects of arbitration
[Vol. XVII426
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unsuccessful.5
B. Creation of SICA and the Role of the SEC
Prior to 1976, most SROs had differing rules for the administration
of securities arbitration disputes.52 In June 1976, the SEC solicited
comments from interested persons on the feasibility of developing a
"uniform system of dispute grievance procedures for the adjudication
of small claims." 53 After conducting a public forum at which written
and oral comments were received, the SEC's Office of Consumer Af-
fairs issued a report recommending the adoption of procedures for
handling investor disputes and the creation of a new entity to admin-
ister the system.54
Before implementing the proposal for a new arbitration forum, the
Commission invited further public comment.5 5 In response to this in-
vitation, several SROs proposed the establishment of a securities in-
dustry task force to consider the development of "a uniform
arbitration code and the means for establishing a more efficient, eco-
nomic and appropriate mechanism for resolving investor disputes in-
volving small sums of money. "56 As a result of this suggestion, a
Securities Industry Conference on Arbitration (SICA) was established
agreements. MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 950, § 12.204 (1978). In a recent case, Securities
Indus. Ass'n v. Connolly, both the District and Circuit courts ruled that state regulations
such as this one were preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act. 703 F. Supp. 146, 153
(D. Mass. 1988), aff'd, 883 F.2d 1114, 1120 (1st Cir. 1989). However, the defendants
have applied for certiorari to the Supreme Court, and although the Court has not yet
granted certiorari, it did request further information. See 58 U.S.L.W. 3457 (U.S. Jan.
16, 1990) (No. 89-894).
51. See S. Hinden, GAO Asked To Investigate Securities Arbitration Issues, Wash.
Post, Feb. 7, 1990, at 2, col. 1; Markey to SEC: What Happened?, 1 SEC. ARB. COMMEN-
TATOR 4, 1 (July 1988); Securities Indus. Assoc. v. Connolly, 883 F.2d 1114 (1st Cir.
1989), petition for cert. filed, 58 U.S.L.W. 3457 (U.S. Jan. 16, 1990) (No. 89-894) (filed
Nov. 29, 1989); see also Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Connolly-Massachusetts Arbitration
Rules Preempted, 2 SEC. ARB. COMMENTATOR 2 (Aug. 1989). But see Stock Arbitration
Case in Top Court, Newsday, Jan. 23, 1990, at 37, col. 1. As to whether the public
voluntarily enters into such agreements, see supra notes 27, 28 and accompanying text;
see also R. Ryder, Securities Arbitration in 1989." Reviewing the Case Law, Securities Arbi-
tration Practice and Procedures, SEC. ARB. INST. AND SEC. ARB. COMMENTATOR 37
.(Nov. 17, 1989) (seminar).
52. See Katsoris II, supra note 16, at 283.
53. Sec. Exch. Act Release No. 12,528 (June 9, 1976), reprinted in 9 SEC Docket 833,
834 (Mar.-July 1976).
54. Sec. Exch. Act Release No. 12,974 (Nov. 15, 1976), reprinted in 10 SEC Docket
955-56 (July-Dec. 1976).
55. See id at 955, 956.
56. See id.; FIFTH REPORT OF THE SECURITIES INDUSTRY CONFERENCE ON ARBI-
TRATION 2 (Apr. 1986) [hereinafter FIFTH REPORT] (available at Fordham Urban Law
Journal office).
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in April 1977, consisting of representatives of various SROs,17 the Se-
curities Industry Association (SIA)58 and the public.59
The Commission then invited proposals from SICA to improve the
methods for resolution of investors' small claims.' After holding nu-
merous meetings throughout the country, SICA developed a simpli-
fied arbitration procedure for resolving customer claims of $2,500 or
less, 61 and issued an informational booklet describing small claims
procedures (Small Claims Booklet).62 Realizing, however, that the
development of a small claims procedure was only a first step, SICA
then developed a comprehensive Uniform Code of Arbitration (Uni-
form Code or Code) for the securities industry. 63 The Code estab-
lished a uniform system of arbitration procedures to cover all claims
by investors.64 In addition, SICA prepared an explanatory booklet
57. The following SROs were represented: the American (ASE), Boston (BSE), Cin-
cinnati (CSE), Midwest (MSE), New York (NYSE), Pacific (PSE) and Philadelphia
(PHSE) Stock Exchanges, the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE), the Municipal
Securities Rulemaking Board (MSRB) and the National Association of Securities Deal-
ers, Inc. (NASD). FIFTH REPORT, supra note 56, at 3.
58. Id. The SIA is a trade association for the securities industry.
59. Peter R. Celia, Jr., Esq., Mortimer Goodman, Esq., and the author have served as
Public Members of SICA since its creation in 1977. Id. In 1983, Justin Klein, Esq., was
added as the fourth Public Member of SICA. Id. The current public members' terms
shall expire, one a year, beginning on December 31, 1989. See SICA: Pre-dispute Clauses
Stay in Customer Agreements, 1 SEC. ARB. 6, at 1 (Sept. 1988). They are each eligible for
reappointment for a new four-year term. All new members will serve for four years and
are eligible for one additional four-year term. The public members whose terms are not
expiring will determine the appointment of new members or reappointment. Id. The
appointment, or reappointment, may be vetoed by a two-thirds vote of the non-public
members of SICA. Id. Mortimer Goodman did not seek re-appointment as a public
member as of the end of 1989, and a new public member will be selected by the remaining
public members to fill this vacancy.
60. Implementation of An Investor Dispute System, Exchange Act Release No., 13,
470 [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 81,136, at 83905 (Apr. 26,
1977) [hereinafter Investor Dispute System].
61. FIFTH REPORT, supra note 56, at 3. SICA subsequently raised the jurisdictional
limit of small claims to $5,000, and then again to the present $10,000. See SEC Ap-
proves NASD Proposal to Raise Ceiling for Simplified Arbitrations, Sec. Reg. & L. Rep.
(BNA) No. 20, at 560 (Apr. 15, 1988).
62. See REPORT OF THE SECURITIES INDUSTRY CONFERENCE ON ARBITRATION TO
THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION: Proposals to Establish a Uniform Sys-
tem for the Resolution of Customer Disputes Involving Small Claims, "How to Proceed
with the Arbitration of a Small Claim" (Appendix D) (Nov. 15, 1977) [hereinafter FIRST
REPORT] (available at Fordham Urban Law Journal office).
63. See Uniform Code of Arbitration (as amended), reprinted in FOURTH REPORT OF
THE SECURITIES INDUSTRY CONFERENCE ON ARBITRATION, Exhibit C (Nov. 1984)
[hereinafter FOURTH REPORT] (available at Fordham Urban Law Journal office). The
small claims procedure was incorporated into § 2 of the Code. See Uniform Code § 2,
infra at 484-86 (Appendix B).
64. FIFTH REPORT, supra note 56, at 2.
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for prospective claimants (Procedures Booklet),65 explaining proce-
dures under the Code. To a large extent, the Code incorporated and
harmonized the rules of the various SROs and codified various proce-
dures that the SROs had followed, but had not included in their ex-
isting rules.66
The original Code was adopted by the participating SROs during
1979 and 1980,67 and appears in the Second Report of SICA to the
SEC.6" Between the time of its initial adoption and the McMahon
case, various revisions were made to both the Code and the Proce-
dures Booklet. These changes were reported in the Third, Fourth and
Fifth SICA Reports to the SEC.6 9
Shortly after McMahon, the SEC dispatched to SICA a list of rec-
ommendations for changes in SRO arbitration, and requested SICA's
comments on these proposed changes.7" SICA responded in a letter
which represented a consensus view of its members. 71 Several mem-
65. See THIRD REPORT OF THE SECURITIES INDUSTRY CONFERENCE ON ARBITRA-
TION TO THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 5 (Jan. 31, 1980) [hereinafter
THIRD REPORT] (available at Fordham Urban Law Journal office); SECURITIES INDUS-
TRY CONFERENCE ON ARBITRATION, ARBITRATION PROCEDURES (1980) [hereinafter
PROCEDURES BOOKLET] (available at Fordham Urban Law Journal office). After Mc-
Mahon, SICA consolidated the Small Claims booklet, see FIRST REPORT, supra note 62,
into the PROCEDURES BOOKLET. See SIXTH REPORT, supra note 49, at 3.
66. See Katsoris II, supra note 16, at 284.
67. FIFTH REPORT, supra note 56, at 4. Once SICA adopts a new rule, each SRO
must then generally go back to their respective organization in order to get a rule change
which is then usually submitted to the SEC for approval. Accordingly, there is often a
time lag between SICA approval and SRO action.
68. See SECOND REPORT OF THE SECURITIES INDUSTRY CONFERENCE ON ARBI-
TRATION TO THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, Exhibit A (Dec. 28, 1978)
[hereinafter SECOND REPORT] (available at Fordham Urban Law Journal office).
69. See THIRD REPORT, supra note 65; FOURTH REPORT, supra note 63; FIFTH RE-
PORT, supra note 56.
70. See Letter from SEC to SICA (Sept. 10, 1987) [hereinafter SEC Letter], reprinted
in J. SCHROPP, SECURITIES ARBITRATION, NEW APPROACHES TO SECURITIES COUN-
SELING AND LITIGATION AFTER McMahon 141-53 (1988) [hereinafter J. SCHROPP]. The
SEC's proposals principally revolved around such issues as: selection, qualification, back-
ground training and evaluation of arbitrators; challenges for cause; method of transcrib-
ing and preserving the record of arbitration hearings; written outline and explanation of
the basis for an award; pre-hearing discovery, depositions and exchange of documents;
expanding the use of educational pamphlets; increased pressure on SRO arbitration sys-
tems brought about by the anticipated increased case load; adherence to Rule 19b-4;
notification of abuses to disciplinary authorities; and large cases. Id.
71. See SICA Letter to Richard G. Ketchum (Dec. 14, 1987) [hereinafter SICA Let-
ter], reprinted in SCHROPP, supra note 70, at 154-69. It is noteworthy, however, that the
composition of SICA is: 10 SROs, the SIA and 4 public members. Obviously, the public
members are in the minority, which means they cannot effect change unilaterally or as
fast as they wish. Nevertheless, even before the intense scrutiny of arbitration brought on
by McMahon, a productive and generally cooperative spirit has prevailed at SICA which
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bers of SICA, however, also sent separate responses.72 Many of these
issues had already been previously discussed at SICA, and SICA's
response was generally in agreement with the SEC's proposals.73 Be-
cause there were some honest disagreements on certain points, further
discussions between SICA and the SEC ensued, leading to many of
the recent changes to the Code which are discussed hereafter 74 and
found in SICA's Sixth Report.75
Since these latest amendments to the Code, SICA continues to meet
in order to monitor the performance of the Code in action, with a
view towards further fine-tuning and adjusting its provisions. Indeed,
SICA has made additional amendments to the Code since the Sixth
Report, which are discussed hereafter in the following section on the
Code.76 To date, over 25,000 cases, including small claims, have been
filed with the participating SROs since the initial approval of the
Code.77 In 1988, the first calendar year after McMahon, the trend
accelerated when over 6,000 such arbitrations were filed before the
participating SROs. s
III. The Arbitration Code-the Rules of the Game
A. Themes of the Code: Economy, Speed and Above All, Fairness
What is attractive about arbitration is that it is expeditious and
economical.79 While speed and economy are important, they cannot
be achieved at the expense of fairness. Fairness, however, is not mu-
tually exclusive of speed or economy, because speed and particularly
economy increase the fairness to public investors who may not have
the resources to sustain the cost of a lengthy proceeding, s° or who
has led to greater uniformity and steady progress and improvement in the Uniform Code
over the years.
72. See, e.g., Letter from Public Members of SICA to Richard G. Ketchum (Oct. 9,
1987) [hereinafter Public Members' Letter], reprinted in SCHROPP, supra note 70, at 170-
72.
73. See SICA Letter, supra note 71, at 155.
74. For discussion of the Code, see infra notes 84-268 and accompanying text.
75. See SIXTH REPORT, supra note 49. This Report was sent to the SEC in the sum-
mer of 1989.
76. See infra notes 84-268 and Uniform Code of Abitration, infra at 484 (Appendix
B).
77. The bulk of said arbitrations are handled before the NASD and the NYSE. See
SIXTH REPORT, supra note 49, at 3-4. A breakdown of the arbitrations handled by the
arbitration facilities of the various SROs appears infra at 483 (Appendix A).
78. Id.
79. M. DOMKE, DOMKE ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 1, T 1.01 (1968).
80. Besides attorneys fees and other related costs-including the loss of time by at-
tending hearings-forum fees are also based upon hearing sessions. See Uniform Code of
Arbitration at § 30(c), infra at 499-500 (Appendix B).
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may have only very small claims."' It is thus critical that the Code's
rules facilitate and maintain these essential characteristics-for justice
unduly delayed, or made prohibitively costly, is justice denied. This is
hardly an insurmountable problem, for all three goals can and should
co-exist, with fairness as the paramount consideration.
Therefore, in maintaining arbitration as an alternative dispute reso-
lution process, it has been necessary for SICA to provide safeguards
to ensure a fair and complete hearing, without destroying the fabric of
arbitration in the process.8 2 Because such safeguards often slow the
proceedings down,83 the benefits of each new procedure must be
weighed against the resultant escalation of time and cost. It is against
this background that SICA adopted the original Arbitration Code
and continues to amend it to this day.
B. The Present Code
The original SICA Code of Arbitration appeared in the Second
SICA Report 4 and was amended many times before McMahon (as
reported in the Third, Fourth and Fifth Reports)85 evolving into the
version which appears in the Sixth SICA Report submitted to the
SEC during the summer of 1989.86 With minor modifications this
Code, as it appears in the Sixth Report, has largely been adopted by
the participating SROs. s7 Since the Sixth Report, however, SICA has
made some additional amendments which will be reported on herein,
and the entire Code (hereinafter "present Code" or "latest Code"), as
amended to reflect all changes (including the latest SICA meeting on
January 17, 1990), appears at the end of this Article as Appendix B.88
The latest Code has thirty-one sections, and the remainder of this
Part discusses these Code provisions as most recently amended. This
Part also tracks their changes from the original version, particularly
those made after McMahon, and discusses the rationale behind those
changes. Finally, this Part suggests possible future alterations of cer-
tain Code provisions.
81. See Uniform Code of Arbitration § 2 (Small Claims), infra at 484-86 (Appendix
B).
82. See supra notes 52-78 and accompanying text.
83. See infra notes 175-202 and accompanying text.
84. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
85. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
86. See SIXTH REPORT, supra note 49.
87. See supra notes 70-75 and accompanying text.
88. See infra at 484 (Appendix B).
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Section 1-Arbitration 89
Section I of the Code sets out the jurisdictional guidelines of SRO
arbitration which permits an SRO to accept a matter upon the de-
mand of a customer or nonmember, even absent an agreement. 90 It
further recognizes, however, the SRO's right to decline the use of its
facilities where the dispute, claim or controversy is not a proper sub-
ject matter for arbitration. 9' The present section 1 is basically un-
changed from the original version.
Section 2-Simplified Arbitration9
This section deals with the Small Claims Simplified Arbitration
procedures. 93 Simplified arbitration is a process by which smaller
claims can be resolved more quickly and at less cost than larger
claims.94 This section has the effect of increasing the fairness of small
claims arbitration, because otherwise, the cost to arbitrate would
often exceed any recovery. Initially this section applied only to situ-
ations where the dollar amount did not exceed $2,500. The amount
was later raised to $5,000, 91 and, finally increased to its present
$10,000 limit. 96 Except for raising the limits, the language of the sec-
tion has changed little other than to increase the deposit and other
costs from a flat $15 fee to a present sliding scale ($15 to $200) reflect-
ing the increase from the original $2,500 limit to the present $10,000
limit.97
Section 3-Hearing Requirements- Waiver of Hearing 98
This section mandates that each dispute, claim or controversy shall
require a hearing, unless the parties waive their right to a hearing, or
the dispute involves a small claim. Section 3 remains unchanged from
the original version.99
89. Uniform Code of Arbitration § 1, infra at 484 (Appendix B).
90. Id. at § 1(a).
91. Id. at § 1(b).
92. Uniform Code of Arbitration § 2, infra at 484-86 (Appendix B).
93. Id.
94. In essence this enhances the fairness of Arbitration procedures, for even those
with small claims can partake.
95. See FOURTH REPORT, supra note 63, at 3; see also Uniform Code of Arbitration
§ 2(a), infra at 484 (Appendix B).
96. See SEC Approves NASD Proposal to Raise Ceiling for Simplified Arbitrations,
Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 20, at 560 (Apr. 15, 1988).
97. See FOURTH REPORT, supra note 63, at 3; see Uniform Code of Arbitration
§ 2(c), infra at 484-85 (Appendix B).
98. Uniform Code of Arbitration § 3, infra at 486 (Appendix B).
99. Id.
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Section 4-Time Limitation Upon Submission o
Section 4 sets out a six year time limitation under the Code from
the time of the occurrence or event giving rise to the claim.1"1 It spe-
cifically provides, however, that this six year provision does not ex-
tend applicable statutes of limitation.102 As a result of an amendment
prior to McMahon, the six year provision is also inapplicable where a
case is directed to arbitration by a court of competent jurisdiction.° 3
Section 5-Dismissal of Proceedings 104
The original version of Section 5 gave arbitrators the discretion to
dismiss the arbitration proceedings at any time upon their own initia-
tive or upon the joint request of the parties.'015 The section was subse-
quently changed before McMahon to its present version by extending
the discretionary power to dismiss to situations where only one party
so requests, 10 6 and by making the dismissal mandatory where the re-
quest is jointly made by the parties. 107
Section 6-Settlements 1'
This section provided that "all settlements upon any matter submit-
ted shall be at the election of the parties," and it remained unchanged
from the original version'019 until very recently. After the Sixth Re-
port, SICA removed the words "upon any matter," as redundant, so
that the section now simply reads: "[a]ll settlements submitted shall
be at the election of the parties."
Section 7-Tolling of Time Limitation(s) for The Institution of
Legal Proceedings "'
This section originally provided for the tolling of time limitations
for the institution of legal proceedings from the time when all parties
filed duly executed submission agreements and continued for such pe-
riod as the SRO retained jurisdiction over the matter."I2 The section
was subsequently expanded prior to McMahon to its present version
100. Uniform Code of Arbitration § 4, infra at 486-87 (Appendix B).
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. See FOURTH REPORT, supra note 63, at 4.
104. Uniform Code of Arbitration § 5, infra at 487 (Appendix B).
105. See SECOND REPORT, supra note 68, at A-4.
106. See THIRD REPORT, supra note 65, at C-3
107. Id.
108. Uniform Code of Arbitration § 6, infra at 487 (Appendix B).
109. See SECOND REPORT, supra note 68, at A-4.
110. Uniform Code of Arbitration § 6, infra at 487 (Appendix B).
111. Id. § 7, infra at 487 (Appendix B).
112. See SECOND REPORT, supra note 68, at A-4.
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which requires: (1) that applicable time limitations for the institution
of legal proceedings would be tolled from the time a duly executed
submission agreement is filed by the claimant or claimants (instead of
all the parties);"I3 and (2) that the six year limitation for the bringing
of arbitration proceedings, as provided in Section 4, is to be extended
by any period during which a court of competent jurisdiction retains
jurisdiction over the matter submitted.' The key reasoning behind
this section is that it would be unfair to the claimant for such limita-
tions to continue to run once the claim is in arbitration, or conversely,
while the dispute is being adjudicated in court.
Section 8-Designation of the Number of Arbitrators 115
This section deals with the composition of the panels. In particu-
lar, it grants to the SRO Director of Arbitration the authority to
choose the panel and its chairman, and directs that the majority of
any panel shall consist of arbitrators who are not from the securities
industry (public arbitrator), unless the public customer or "nonmem-
ber" requests otherwise. 116
The original section provided for panels of three members where
the matter in controversy did not exceed $100,000 and five members
in excess of that amount.1 1 7 Largely for reasons of economy and effi-
ciency, that has been whittled down to three person panels for contro-
versies exceeding $10,000, or where no money claim is involved or
disclosed. 118 In claims involving $10,000 or less, only one arbitrator
need be appointed.119 The NASD has extended this one arbitrator
rule to situations involving $30,000 or less. 120 Nevertheless, many ar-
bitrators-particularly those from the public who are independent of,
but not necessarily familiar with the securities industry practices-
feel uncomfortable sitting alone without the counsel of an industry
arbitrator.
Although this section always provided that the majority of the arbi-
113. See FOURTH REPORT, supra note 63, at C-3; see also Uniform Code of Arbitra-
tion § 7(a), infra at 487 (Appendix B).
114. See FOURTH REPORT, supra note 63, at C-3; see also Uniform Code of Arbitra-
tion § 7(a), infra at 487 (Appendix B).
115. Uniform Code of Arbitration § 8, infra at 487-88 (Appendix B).
116. Id. § 8(a). The term nonmember was added to the section after McMahon. See
SIXTH REPORT, supra note 49, at 6.
117. See THIRD REPORT, supra note 65, at C-4.
118. See SIXTH REPORT, supra note 49, at 6.
119. Id.
120. See 2 SEC. ARB. COMMENTATOR 5, 4; see also Masucci, Maintaining The Fairness
of Arbitration, SECURITIES ARBITRATION PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE SEMINAR at 144-
45 (Nov. 17, 1989) [hereinafter Masucci].
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trators on any panel be public arbitrators, no further guidance was
given by the original Code as to who qualified to be a public arbitra-
tor. 2' The original version of the Procedures Booklet, however, de-
scribed public arbitrators as "individuals who are neither associated
with, nor employed by a broker-dealer or securities industry organiza-
tion." '122 SICA initially left this test flexible so that the vast experi-
ence of many needed and qualified persons would not be lost. As time
went on, however, it became apparent that the category of public arbi-
trator had to be more clearly defined. Accordingly, Guidelines for the
Classification of Public Arbitrators were added to the Procedures
Booklet. 123 After McMahon, however, SICA further tightened the
classification by amending Section 8 of the Code to specifically ex-
clude as public arbitrators: (1) brokers and registered investment ad-
visers and persons who are retired from the securities industry;
(2) persons who had been employed in the industry in the past three
years; (3) professionals, i.e., attorneys or accountants, who devote
20% or more of their work efforts to securities industry clients; and
(4) spouses of industry personnel. 124
Section 9-Notice of Selection of Arbitrators 125
Before the McMahon decision, this section merely required that the
Director of Arbitration inform the parties of the names and business
affiliations of the arbitrators at least eight business days prior to the
121. See FIFTH REPORT, supra note 56, at 32.
122. See THIRD REPORT (Proposed Uniform Booklet Explaining Arbitration Proce-
dures), supra note 65, at Exhibit B.
123. See FIFTH REPORT, supra note 56, at 17.
Guidelines for the Classification of Persons as Public Arbitrators
No one may serve as a public arbitrator who has been an employee or partner
of a member organization or subsidiary thereof, or a shareholder of a non-pub-
licly owned member organization or subsidiary thereof for a period of three
years immediately preceding his or her appointment as a public arbitrator.
Additional information concerning a particular arbitrator may be obtained
by a party or the party's attorney upon request directed to the Director of Arbi-
tration prior to the commencement of the hearing or a submission to the arbi-
trator without a hearing.
Id.
124. See SIXTH REPORT, supra note 49, at 6-7. The NYSE guidelines for the classifica-
tion of public arbitrators are even more stringent. See Katsoris I, supra note 12, at 378
n.98. Indeed, such NYSE guidelines provide that "[a]ny close question on arbitrator
classification or on challenges for cause shall be decided in favor of public customers."
Id.; see also Neal, Securities Arbitration Administration and Procedures at the Chicago
Board Options Exchange, Inc., SECURITIES ARBITRATION 1989, PLI SEMINAR, at 656-
57; Noah & Stroughter, Arbitration At The American Stock Exchange, SECURITIES ARBI-
TRATION 1989, PLI SEMINAR at 579-80.
125. Uniform Code of Arbitration § 9, infra at 488-89 (Appendix B).
1990]
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL
date fixed for the initial hearing session.'26 Since McMahon, the sec-
tion has been significantly expanded. 127
The Director of Arbitration must now also inform the parties of the
arbitrators' employment histories for the past ten years in addition to
the expanded disclosures required by Section 11.128 Moreover, the
right of a party to make further inquiry of the Director concerning an
arbitrator's background is now included in the rule. 29 Previously,
this right was only mentioned in the Procedures Booklet. 3° In addi-
tion, the expanded section 9 grants to the Director the power to desig-
nate a replacement arbitrator should an appointed one become
disqualified, resign, die, refuse, or otherwise be unable to perform
prior to the first hearing. '3' Consistent with the other provisions of
Section 9, the replacement provision imposes disclosure requirements
upon the Director, so as to meaningfully preserve the right to chal-
lenge the replacement arbitrator under Section 10.132 Vacancies oc-
curring after the commencement of the first hearing are specifically
covered by Section 12.133
Section lO-Challenges 13
Initially, this section dealt only with peremptory challenges and
granted one such challenge to each party only when panels consisted
of more than one arbitrator. '" Thereafter the peremptory challenge
was extended (similar to the present rule) to all panels (regardless of
size).136 However, the new section does limit multiple claimants, re-
spondents and third-party respondents to one peremptory challenge,
unless the Director determines that justice requires the granting of
additional such challenges.' 37 The section was further amended at
that time to Specifically permit unlimited challenges for cause.'38
126. See SECOND REPORT, supra note 68, at A-5.
127. See SIXTH REPORT, supra note 49, at 7.
128. See infra notes 139-43 and accompanying text.
129. See Uniform Code of Arbitration § 9, infra at 488-89 (Appendix B).
130. See Procedures Booklet, supra note 65, at 3.
131. See Uniform Code of Arbitration § 9, infra at 488-89 (Appendix B).
132. See infra notes 134-38 and accompanying text; see also Uniform Code of Arbitra-
tion §§ 9, 10, infra at 488-89 (Appendix B).
133. See infra notes 144-50 and accompanying text.
134. See also Uniform Code of Arbitration § 10, infra at 489 (Appendix B).
135. See SECOND REPORT, supra note 68, at A-5.
136. See FOURTH REPORT, supra note 63, at C-4.
137. Id.; see also Uniform Code of Arbitration § 10, infra at 489 (Appendix B).
138. See FOURTH REPORT, supra note 63, at C-4.
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Section 11-Disclosures Required by Arbitrators '3
Originally, Section 11 merely required each arbitrator to disclose to
the Director of Arbitration any circumstances which might preclude
such arbitrator from rendering an objective and impartial determina-
tion."4 The section was soon expanded to specifically authorize the
Director to remove such an arbitrator before the commencement of
the first hearing, or in the absence of removal, to inform the parties of
any such information. 4'
After McMahon the section was significantly expanded to parallel
Canon II of the Code of Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial Dis-
putes (Code of Ethics) by explicitly imposing a duty upon the arbitra-
tor to disclose any potential conflict, which continues throughout the
proceeding. 4 ' To facilitate this process, arbitrators now receive a
copy of the Code of Ethics each time they are assigned to a case in
order to highlight the types of disclosures required. For example, the
Code of Ethics requires that an arbitrator reveal any direct or indirect
financial or personal interest in the outcome of the arbitration, and
any existing or past financial, business, professional, family or social
relationships, which are likely to affect impartiality or that might rea-
sonably create an appearance of bias.' 43
Section 12-Disqualification or Other Disability of Arbitrators'4
Before McMahon, this section simply provided that if an arbitrator
became disabled or disqualified after the commencement of the first
session, the Director of Arbitration could either appoint a replace-
ment or allow the arbitration to proceed with the remaining panel.'4 5
In either case, further arbitration proceeded only with the consent or
waiver of the parties.' 46 In the absence of consent or waiver, the hear-
ing had to start de novo. 47
Because this often resulted in a Waste of time and effort, the section
was recently amended to allow the hearings to continue before the
139. Uniform Code of Arbitration § 11, infra at 489-90 (Appendix B).
140. See SECOND REPORT, supra note 68, at A-5. For a lengthier discussion of disclo-
sure requirements as they relate to the arbitrator, see supra notes 128-30 and infra notes
142-43 and accompanying text.
141. See THIRD REPORT, supra note 65, at C-5.
142. See SIXTH REPORT, supra note 49, at 7-8. As to a Code of Ethics for arbitrators,
see infra notes 296-97 and accompanying text, and as to judges, see infra note 298.
143. See SIXTH REPORT, supra note 49, at 7-8. For discussion of conflict of interest see
infra notes 283-317 and accompanying text.
144. Uniform Code of Arbitration § 12, infra at 490 (Appendix B).
145. See SECOND REPORT, supra note 68, at A-5, A-6.
146. Id.
147. See SIXTH REPORT, supra note 49, at 2.
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remaining arbitrators when a vacancy occurs, unless one of the parties
objects. 4 ' In the event of an objection, the Director shall appoint a
new member to fill the vacancy.' 49 The section as it presently stands
preserves the requirements of background disclosure, as well as the
right to challenge the new panel member.150
Section 13-Initiation of Proceedings ' '
Initially this section set out the requirements for the commence-
ment of an arbitration proceeding by setting out the general pleading
and service requirements regarding such items as the statement of
claim, submission agreement, answer, counterclaims and/or cross-
claims and claims over. 5 2 The section also permitted joinder and
consolidation, which the Director of Arbitration would rule on ini-
tially, leaving the ultimate decision to the arbitration panel. 53
SICA subsequently tightened this section by permitting arbitrators
to bar evidence at a hearing where only a general denial was pleaded,
or where available defenses were not pleaded. 154 The authority to bar
evidence at the hearing was further extended"55 to situations where a
party fails to file a timely answer.
After McMahon, and largely for purposes of trimming costs, SICA
amended Section 13 to require the parties to serve certain plead-
ings. I" The arbitration staffs, however, continue to be responsible for
serving the claim. 57 Thereafter, however, the parties will serve all
other pleadings and file copies with the arbitration departments.'
To aid this new procedure, Section 13(b) specifically permits service
by mail.'5 9
After the issuance of the Sixth Report, SICA amended Section
13(d) into its present form. In changing the section, SICA revised
subparagraph one to parallel the language of Federal Rule of Civil
148. See id. at 8.
149. Id.; see also Uniform Code of Arbitration § 12, infra at 490 (Appendix B).
150. Id.
151. Uniform Code of Arbitration § 13, infra at 490-94 (Appendix B).
152. See SECOND REPORT, supra note 68, at A-6, A-7.
153. Id.
154. See FOURTH REPORT, supra note 63, at C-5, C-6; see also Uniform Code of Arbi-
tration § 13(c)(2)(i), infra at 491 (Appendix B).
155. See FIFrH REPORT, supra note 56, at 33-34; see also Uniform Code of Arbitration
§ 13(c)(2)(iii), infra at 492 (Appendix B).
156. See SIXTH REPORT, supra note 49, at 8-9; see also Uniform Code of Arbitration
§ 13(a), infra at 490-91 (Appendix B).
157. Id.
158. Id. § 13(c).
159. Id. § 13(b).
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Procedure 20(a) on permissive joinders. 6° SICA also revised the sec-
ond subparagraph of 13(d) to clarify the fact that multiple claimants
may file together, eliminating the implication that filings must first be
made separately and then joined; but, as to such jointly filed claims,
the Arbitration Director is still authorized to sever such claims. 161
However, SICA retained the Arbitration Director's right to consoli-
date separately filed claims in subparagraph three, 162 as well as the
proviso that arbitrators shall make all final determinations on all of
these issues, in subparagraph four. 16 3
SICA has also studied the rather complex problem of class actions
in arbitration and has concluded, for a variety of reasons-particu-
larly the difficult problem of class determination-that court-ordered
arbitration be a prerequisite for SRO acceptance of a class action mat-
ter.'" Absent such court order, parties similarly situated could still
avail themselves of the remedies of joinder and consolidation provided
under the section. 165
Section 14-Designation of Time and Place of Hearings 166
This section originally provided that "[u]nless the law directs other-
wise," the Director of Arbitration determines the time and place for
the initial hearing upon notice of at least, eight business days; thereaf-
ter, the arbitrators would determine the time and place of hearings. 167
Subsequent to the Sixth Report, however, SICA has amended Section
14, eliminating the reference "unless the law directs otherwise."' 161
This was done so as to nullify selection of hearing provisions incorpo-
rated into brokerage contracts, thus preventing a member firm from
unfairly controlling the selection of a hearing location, and thereby
causing the customer to bear unreasonable expenses in pursuit of a
claim.
Section 15-Representation by Counsel 169
This secti6n, which has never changed, simply provides that all
160. Id. § 13(d)(1).
161. Id. § 13(d)(2); see also infra notes 276, 279-80 and accompanying text.
162. Id. § 13(d)(3).
163. Id. § 13(d)(4).
164. See 2 SEC. ARB. COMMENTATOR 9, at 7 (Sept. 1989); see also generally Classwide
Arbitration and 10(b)-5 Claims in the Wake of Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. Mc-
Mahon, 74 CORNELL L.R. 380 (1989).
165. See Uniform Code of Arbitration § 13(d), infra at 492-93 (Appendix B).
166. Id. § 14, infra at 493 (Appendix B).
167. See SECOND REPORT, supra note 68, at A-8.
168. See Uniform Code of Arbitration § 14, infra at 493 (Appendix B).
169. Id. § 15, infra at 493 (Appendix B).
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parties have the right to representation by counsel. 170
Section 16-Attendance at Hearings 171
Section 16 provides that except for parties and their counsel, the
arbitrators decide the attendance or presence of other parties at the
hearings. This section has not changed since the original Code.' 17 2
Section 17-Failure to Appear'73
This section has provided since the original Code for a hearing to
be held and an award rendered despite the fact that a party fails to
appear after due notice was given.
'71
Section 18-Adjournments 17
Originally, this section merely authorized arbitrators to grant ad-
journments. 176 Unfortunately, the issue of adjournments has become
chronic. A horseback survey at several of the SROs revealed that
approximately one-third of the cases heard have their first hearing
date adjourned after the panel has already been appointed. 177 Fur-
thermore, even this first adjourned date is often subsequently ad-
journed again one or more times before the first hearing is held.
Although most of the time, all the parties have agreed to these ad-
170. See SECOND REPORT, supra note 68, at A-8; see also Uniform Code of Arbitration
§ 15, infra at 493 (Appendix B).
171. Id. § 16, infra at 493 (Appendix B).
172. Id.; see also SECOND REPORT, supra note 68, at A-8. SICA recently amended the
Arbitrator's Manual (see infra note 335) to add thereto a new paragraph dealing with the
"Attendance of Witnesses at the Hearing." See Supplemental Text for the SICA Arbitra-
tor's Manual, 2 SEC. ARe. COMMENTATOR 15 (Sept. 1989).
Arbitrators have the authority under the Uniform Code to determine who
may attend the hearing. Sometimes there is a disagreement among the parties
as to whether an expert witness should be permitted to attend the hearing ses-
sions at times other than when he is testifying. Arbitrators should consider that
expert witnesses often serve an important role in assisting parties and their
counsel in the presentation of their cases, and also may be asked to testify about
what has been said at the hearing in addition to the facts known to them prior
to the hearing. Barring countervailing reasons, expert witnesses who are assist-
ing parties in the presentation of their cases should be permitted to attend all
hearings. Generally, there is a presumption that expert witnesses, as opposed to
witnesses testifying as to the facts pertinent to the case, will be permitted to
attend the entire proceedings.
Id.; see also Goldberg, An Argument for Non Sequestration of Expert Witnesses, 2 SEC.
ARB. COMMENTATOR 1 (Apr. 1989).
173. Uniform Code of Arbitration § 17, infra at 493-94 (Appendix B).
174. Id.; see also SECOND REPORT, supra note 68, at A-8.
175. Uniform Code of Arbitration § 18, infra 494 (Appendix B).
176. See SECOND REPORT, supra note 68, at A-8.
177. Katsoris, Adjournments, The Arbitration Virus, 2 SEC. ARB. COMMENTATOR 2
(Jan. 1989) (hereinafter Katsoris IV).
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journments, they have a crippling effect on the arbitration process.
Often it results in having to replace arbitrators, who have already
cleared the challenge and conflict processes,"I because their schedules
cannot accommodate the new adjourned date. This generally causes
additional delay, because the SRO staff must then find a replacement
arbitrator or arbitrators, who must then also clear the challenge and
conflict hurdles de novo. Furthermore, such repeated cancellations
discourage many excellent arbitrators from serving, either because it
results in their replacement, or their having to set aside two or three
dates before the first hearing is actually held.
Thus, these seemingly harmless adjournments undercut the two ad-
vantages of arbitration-speed and economy. 7 9 The more adjourn-
ments that are granted, the longer the day of resolution is delayed,
and the more expensive it becomes to the parties and to the arbitra-
tion forum in administering the system.
This is not to suggest that legitimate requests for adjournments
should not be granted. In fact, parties should be given the benefit of
the doubt in this regard. However, the practice of seemingly auto-
matic granting of adjournments, when both parties consent, is strain-
ing and undermining the legitimate goal of keeping arbitration
speedy, economical and fair.
Before McMahon, SICA addressed this problem by amending Sec-
tion 18. 1° Originally the section provided that if a party requested an
adjournment (after the arbitrators have already been appointed) and
the adjournment was granted, that party had to pay a fee equal to the
deposit of costs, but not more than $100.IsI It became evident that
this penalty was not a sufficient deterrent. 8 2 Accordingly, after the
Sixth Report SICA repealed the then subdivision (b) and replaced it
with the following:
(b) [a] party requesting an adjournment after arbitrators have been
appointed shall, if an adjournment is granted, deposit a fee, equal
to the initial deposit of forum fees for the first adjournment and
twice the initial deposit of forum fees, not to exceed $1,000, for a
second or subsequent adjournment requested by that party. The
178. See supra notes 134-50 and accompanying text; see also Uniform Code of Arbitra-
tion §§ 10, 11, 12, infra at 489-90 (Appendix B).
179. See infra notes 79-83 and accompanying text; see also Katsoris I, supra note 12, at
381.
180. See FivTH REPORT, supra note 56, at 35.
181. Id.
182. The persistence of the issue of repeated adjournments became of great concern to
SICA, which lead to a change in the rule. See Katsoris I, supra note 12, at 381.
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arbitrators may waive the deposit of this fee or in their awards may
direct the return of the adjournment fee.
(c) Upon receiving a third request consented to by all parties for an
adjournment, the arbitrators may dismiss the arbitration without
prejudice to the claimant filing a new arbitration." 3
In sum, this section articulates the important policy that adjourn-
ments be limited to those instances where they are truly necessary.1"4
It would be ironic that after all the effort to improve the substance
and image of securities arbitrations, the virus of unnecessary adjourn-
ments could sap its vitality and usefulness.8 5
Section 19-Acknowledgement of Pleadings 186
Ever since the original Code, this section has required that the arbi-
trators acknowledge to all parties present that they have read the filed
pleadings. 87
Section 20-General Provisions Governing A Pre-Hearing Pro-
ceeding 188
The present Section 20 contains the provisions of the original Code
Sections 20 (Subpoena Process)' 89 and 21 (Power to Direct Appear-
ances). 90 Under those provisions the parties were expected to ex-
change documents informally as would "serve to expedite the
arbitration."' 191 There was, however, no established mechanism to en-
sure that parties cooperate in document production. Accordingly,
some parties did not produce documents until the day of the hearing.
Such a practice was patently unfair. 19 2
Under their broad powers, arbitrators have always had the author-
ity to resolve discovery disputes in advance of the hearing.' 93 Indeed,
even before McMahon, some SROs forwarded discovery disputes to
arbitrators prior to hearings on the merits, giving the panel chairman
183. Uniform Code of Arbitration § 18(b)-(c), infra at 494 (Appendix B).
184. See Katsoris IV, supra note 177.
185. Id.
186. Uniform Code of Arbitration § 19, infra at 494 (Appendix B).
187. Id; see also SECOND REPORT, supra note 68, at A-8.
188. Uniform Code of Arbitration § 20, infra at 494-96 (Appendix B).
189. See FiFTH REPORT, supra note 56, at 35.
190. Id.
191. Id.; see also Uniform Code of Arbitration §§ 20(f), 20(g), infra at 496 (Appendix
B).
192. This forced the demanding party into the unenviable choice of proceeding with
the hearing without having an adequate opportunity to examine the produced documents,
or of seeking a delay from arbitrators who had planned to start the hearings on that day.
It often resulted in trial by ambush.
193. See Katsoris I, supra note 12, at 372.
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the authority to resolve discovery disputes in advance of the first hear-
ing. '94 Some arbitrators, however, particularly those who were not
attorneys, were reluctant to exercise such powers without specific au-
thorization in the Uniform Code.
It became apparent after McMahon that the time had arrived to
codify the informal practice of some SROs to get the arbitrators in-
volved in discovery disputes before the first hearing. Accordingly, in
addition to collapsing the old Sections 20 and 21 into the present Sec-
tion 20, SICA added specific provisions relating to prehearing confer-
ences and document and information production.'95
Under the new Section 20, a request for documents or information
can be served as soon as twenty business days after service of the
Statement of Claim. 196 If a party objects or fails to honor a request, a
prehearing conference may be called to resolve the impasse.' 97 Sec-
tion 20 authorizes a sole arbitrator from the proposed panel to issue
subpoenas and set deadlines for compliance with discovery orders. 9s
These deadlines may fall prior to the hearing date. Prior to the initial
hearing date, the new Section 20 also requires the parties to exchange
witness lists and the documents that they intend to use in their direct
case.' 99 Finally, all parties to a dispute must now receive copies of
any subpoenas issued.2 °°
In practice, some of the pre-hearing discussions are held by confer-
ence call. Although this method is cheaper and more convenient, it is
not always productive. In that case, the arbitrator overseeing the dis-
covery should order a formal face-to-face hearing. The best hope for
preventing these procedures from dragging out and increasing the
cost of the litigation-as often happens in court proceedings-is to
have experienced and knowledgeable arbitrators who will not let mat-
ters get out of hand.
The Uniform Code omits any reference to pre-hearing deposi-
tions. 20  However, the circumstances under which such depositions
will be ordered by the arbitrators are discussed in the SICA Arbitra-
194. Id.
195. See SIXTH REPORT, supra note 49, at 2.
196. See Uniform Code of Arbitration § 20(b)(1), infra at 494-95 (Appendix B).
197. Id. § 20(b)(4); see also Spiralling Discovery Costs Compel Amending Rule 26 and
Adopting New Local Rule, 22 N.Y. ST. B.A. REPORTS 3, at 20 (Trusts and Estates law
section) (Fall 1989).
198. Id. § 20(e).
199. Id. § 20(c).
200. Id. § 20(f).
201. Cf id. § 20.
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tor's Manual.2 °2
On the whole, the new procedures enhance rather than detract
from the arbitration process. Admittedly, the new procedures under
Section 20, which are also addressed in the Arbitrator's Manual, may
initially involve some additional cost and time, but that is more than
counterbalanced by the equitable consideration of preventing undue
surprise and possible prejudice to either party once the hearing on the
merits begins. In fact, the resolution of such disputes before the first
hearing will often save time and expense at the hearing.
Section 21-Evidence 203
Section 21 provides that the arbitrators determine the admissibility
of evidence and in so doing are not bound by the Federal Rules of
Evidence, or state evidentiary rules.2 1 Section 21 remains unchanged
except that after McMahon, its number was changed from 22.205
Section 22-Interpretation of the Code 206
Section 22 provides that arbitrators have the final authority to in-
terpret the provisions of the Code, and remains unchanged except
that after McMahon, its number was changed from 23.207
Section 23-Determinations of Arbitrators208
Section 23 provides that rulings and determinations of the panel
202. See infra note 337 and accompanying text. The Arbitrator's Manual was recently
amended to include the following explanation regarding arbitrator's powers:
This includes the ability to issue orders for the production of witnesses for
depositions when deemed appropriate by the arbitrators and where it is impossi-
ble to compel the attendance of the person to be deposed. Access to depositions
should be granted to preserve the testimony of ill or dying witnesses, or. of per-
sons who are unable or unwilling to travel long distances for a hearing and may
not otherwise be required to attend the hearing, as well as to expedite large or
complex cases, and in other situations deemed appropriate by the arbitrator.
Balanced against this ability, however, is a traditional reserve towards the
overuse of depositions in arbitration. The effective use of discovery tools such
as depositions rests in the careful exercise of judgment by the arbitrators. Care
should be taken to avoid unnecessary expense or burdens to the parties and to
avoid unnecessary delay. It is appropriate for arbitrators to consider whether
the witness will be able to appear at the arbitration hearing, the necessity of
preserving the witness' testimony, and other factors that bear on the efficiency
and fairness of the proceeding.
See Supplemental Text for the SICA Arbitrator's Manual, 2 SEC. ARB. COMMENTATOR
15 (Sept. 1989).
203. Uniform Code of Arbitration § 21, infra at 496 (Appendix B).
204. Id.
205. See SIXTH REPORT, supra note 49, at 10.
206. Uniform Code of Arbitration § 22, infra at 496-97 (Appendix B).
207. See SIXTH REPORT, supra note 49, at 10.
208. Uniform Code of Arbitration § 23, infra at 497 (Appendix B).
SECURITIES ARBITRA TION
shall be made by a majority of the panel.2"9 Aside from its number,
which was 24 prior to McMahon, this section also remains
unchanged.210
Section 24-Record of Proceedings 211
Before McMahon, this Section was numbered 25 and did not re-
quire that a record of the arbitration proceeding be kept.212 After
McMahon the. section was renumbered 24 and amended to require
that a stenographic record or tape recording of all proceedings be
kept. 13 This flexibility as to the method of recording takes into ac-
count the significant cost differential between a stenographic record
and a tape recording. Nevertheless, in a multi-sessioned proceeding
spanning over a long period of time, the printed record is preferable,
because it more easily enables arbitrators to refresh their recollection
of past testimony.
Section 25-Oaths of the Arbitrators and Witnesses 214
Before McMahon, this was numbered Section 26.2l5 Other than
that, the section has always provided that the oath or affirmation shall
be administered to the arbitrators before the first session and that all
testimony shall be under oath or affirmation.2 1 6
Section 26-Amendmentsl 7
In the original Code, this was known as Section 27 and simply pro-
vided that amended pleadings would not be permitted after receipt of
a responsive pleading without the consent of the arbitrators.21 8 Before
McMqhon, however, the section was amended by setting up a proce-
dure for amending pleadings-even after receipt of a responsive
pleading-before the appointment of the arbitration panel.219 The
substance of this section has remained intact after McMahon,
although it was renumbered Section 26.2120
209. Id.
210. See SIXTH REPORT, supra note 49, at 10.
211. Uniform dode of Arbitration § 24, infra at 497 (Appendix B).
212. See FiFrtH REPORT, supra note 56, at 36.
213. See SIXTH REPORT, supra note 49, at 11.
214. Uniform Code of Arbitration § 25, infra at 497 (Appendix B).
215. See FIFTH REPORT, supra note 56, at 36.
216. See SIXTH REPORT, supra note 49, at 11.
217. Uniform Code of Arbitration § 26, infra at 497 (Appendix B).
218. See SECOND REPORT, supra note 68, at A-10.
219. See FOURTH REPORT, supra note 63, at C-8.
220. See SIXTH REPORT, supra note 49, at 11.
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Section 2 7-Reopenings of Hearings 221
Other than the recent number change from 28 to 27,222 this section
has since its inception permitted the reopening of hearings by the arbi-
trators on their own motion, or in the discretion of the arbitrators,
upon application of a party at any time before the award is
rendered.223
Section 28-Awards
224
Prior to McMahon, this section was numbered 29 and basically pro-
vided that: (1) all awards had to be in writing and signed by a major-
ity of the arbitrators; (2) all awards were deemed final and not subject
to review or appeal; (3) arbitrators should endeavor to render the
award within thirty business days from the date the record was
closed; and (4) there are particular means by which the Director of
Arbitration was to serve the award on the parties.225
After McMahon, Section 29 was renumbered Section 28, and SICA
amended it to require that the award also include summary data, such
as a description of the issues in controversy and the amounts claimed
and awarded.226 This data is to be available to the public in accord-
ance with the policies of the sponsoring SRO. 227 Indeed, presently an
outside vendor is publishing such awards.2 2 s
Even with these additional requirements, however, the section still
falls short of requiring written opinions, although arbitrators are free
to do so. At first blush, this may seem to be a weakness of the Code,
and perhaps to some, a weakness of arbitration in general.229 The
argument is that written opinions should be required, because they
would give insight to the parties as to the rationale for the award. In
addition, it would help the parties in formulating opinions about arbi-
trators with a view to exercising their peremptory challenges.
On the other hand, requiring written opinions would certainly slow
down the rendering of awards, for awards are often arrived at on the
basis of consensus.23 ° For example, suppose there are three arbitra-
221. Uniform Code of Arbitration § 27, infra at 498 (Appendix B).
222. See SIXTH REPORT, supra note 49, at 11.
223. See SECOND REPORT, supra note 68, at A-10.
224. Uniform Code of Arbitration § 28, infra at 498 (Appendix B).
225. See FIFTH REPORT, supra note 56, at 36-37.
226. See SIXTH REPORT, supra note 49, at 11.
227. Id.
228. See 2 SEC. ARB. COMMENTATOR 6-7 (Award Report) (June 1989); see also SEC.
ARB. COMMENTATOR 2-7 (Award Report) (Oct. 1989). Indeed, some awards are being
analyzed and commented upon. Id. at 8-10.
229. See Katsoris I, supra note 12, at 382.
230. Id.
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tors, A, B & C, and they found damages of $10,000, $20,000 and
$30,000, respectively, and they ultimately agree on a $20,000 award.
When they write the opinion, however, A bases his award on unsuita-
bility, B on churning and C on unauthorized trading. Can A, B and C
issue an award for $20,000, even though they cannot agree on the
reasons? Moreover, would they?
Written opinions would not necessarily enhance the cause of fair-
ness. 231 In some instances mandatory opinions might even result in
fewer awards in favor of claimants on general equity grounds.2 32 It
would also put additional pressure on the already strained staffs of the
administering forum while drafts of written opinions would be circu-
lated and recirculated among the various arbitrators for corrections,
redrafts and finalization.233
In addition, it is respectfully submitted that instead of being used as
a window into the rationale of arbitrators, a written opinion will be
used' as a platform and blueprint for many more appeals, because it
identifies targets, meaningful or otherwise, for the losing party to at-
tack. Appeals are both costly and time consuming and ultimately re-
sult in undue delay in the payment of any award.234
231. Id. at 383.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. The scope of judicial review of an arbitration award is very limited. Goldberg, A
Supreme Court Justice Looks at Arbitration, 20 ARB. J. 63 § 6.03 at 61 (1965), [hereinaf-
ter Supreme Court Justice]. "If the award is within the submission, and contains the
honest decision of the arbitrators, after a full and fair hearing of the parties, a court of
equity will not set it aside for error, either in law or fact." Burchell v. Marsh, 58 U.S.
344, 349 (1854). In fact, the typical grounds for vacating an arbitration award are sur-
prisingly uniform throughout the United States, namely:
(1) There was an undisclosed relationship between an arbitrator and a party or
his counsel affecting the arbitrator's impartiality or appearance of
impartiality.
(2) An arbitrator was corrupt.
(3) The arbitrators did not schedule or conduct the hearing in a fair and judi-
cious manner.
(4) The arbitrators granted relief that they were not authorized to grant under
the contract pursuant to which the arbitration was held.
See Supreme Court Justice, supra, § 6.03 at 63; see also § 10 of the United States Arbitra-
tion Act, 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1982); see also B. N. Smiley, Stockbroker-Customer Disputes:
Making A Case For Arbitration, 23 GEORGIA STATE BAR J. 195 (1987).
The greatest advantage of arbitration is that awards are almost irreversible.
This is perhaps its greatest peril as well .... An award which has a legal or
factual basis which may be rationally inferred from the evidence will be upheld.
Arbitration awards will not be set aside for a mistake of law unless the arbitra-
tors have acted in 'manifest disregard' of the law.
Id. at 200 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). For an award to be vacated on this
ground, "[tihe error must have been . . .readily and instantly perceived by the average
person qualified to serve as an arbitrator." Merrill Lynch, Pierce Fenner & Smith v.
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Undue delay is particularly injurious to the small investor, who
may have an immediate need for the money- Indeed, SICA was con-
cerned that some dealers unduly delayed payment of awards issued
against them. Accordingly, after the Sixth Report, Section 28 was
further amended by adding subdivisions (g) and (h) thereto, which
provide:
(g) In addition, arbitrators may award interest as they deem ap-
propriate. All awards shall bear interest from the date of the
award until payment at the legal rate, if any, then prevailing in
the state where the award was rendered, or at a rate set by the
arbitrator(s) in the award.
(h) All monetary awards shall be paid within thirty (30) days of
receipt unless a motion to vacate has been filed with a court of
competent jurisdiction.235
At one point, SICA considered the inclusion of a bond or escrow re-
quirement in the Uniform Code to insure such prompt payment.236
Instead, SICA abandoned the bond or escrow idea because it was un-
duly burdensome, and merely settled on the aforementioned thirty
day rule. 237 This payment requirement is a distinct advantage, over
court-litigated awards or those issued at the AAA, which has no dis-
ciplinary authority over the dealer.238
Bobker, 808 F.2d 930, 933 (2d Cir. 1986). "Moreover, the term 'disregard' implies that
the arbitrator appreciates the existence of a clearly governing legal principle but decides
to ignore or pay no attention to it." Id. (citing Bell Aerospace Co. Div. of Textron v.
Local 516, United Auto Workers of Am., 356 F. Supp. 354, 356 (W.D.N.Y 1973), rev'd
on other grounds, 500 F.2d 921 (2d Cir. 1974)). SICA did consider broadening the scope
of review of securities arbitration awards. See Minority Report of Mortimer Goodman,
Public Member Security Industry Conference on Arbitration, In Respect of a Right of
Review of an Arbitration Award (filed with the SEC on Dec. 15, 1977) (available at Ford-
ham Urban Law Journal office). The proposal was rejected as inimical to the simplicity
and brevity of arbitration procedures. See Uniform Code of Arbitration, § 28b, reprinted
in SIXTH REPORT, supra note 49. It is also interesting to note that the American Arbitra-
tion Association (see infra note 369) does not encourage written opinions. See Coulson,
Securities Arbitration at the American Arbitration Association, Securities Arbitration
1989, PLI Seminar 683, at 696 [hereinafter Coulson]. Moreover, in an attempt to wean
written opinions, it has recently been suggested that such requests be accompanied by an
undertaking that the award would not be challenged. See 2 SEC. ARB. COMMENTATOR 7
(May 1989); see also Challenging Securities Industry Arbitration Awards, N.Y.L.J., Feb.
16, 1990 at 1, col. 1.
235. See Uniform Code of Arbitration § 28(g), (h), infra at 499 (Appendix B); see also
2 SEC. ARB. COMMENTATOR 12 (June 1989).
236. A stricter 20 day rule with an escrow provision was, however, approved by the
Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board. See § 31 MSRB Rules of Arbitration, reprinted
in Arbitration Information & Rules, Municipal Securities Rulemaking Book (1989), at 30
(available at the Fordham Urban Law Journal).
237. Id.
238. The NASD, however, is proposing to include the AAA in its resolution authoriz-
[Vol. :XVII
1990] SECURITIES ARBITRATION 449
The issue of punitive damages and treble damages under the Rack-
eteer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act (RICO),239 in arbitra-
tion, which are punitive in nature, have also presented a problem.
Indeed, of late, the problem has become more urgent because they are
with greater frequency pleaded as alternative relief in statements of
claim. 21 In any event, if an award was made either for punitive dam-
ages or under RICO it should be so stated separately in the award.241
The McMahon decision clearly recognized the arbitrability of
RICO claims.242 Much discussion has been generated, however, over
whether RICO should be restricted or abolished-not just in securi-
ties arbitration, but civil litigation generally.243 The overall merits of
permitting RICO allegations in securities arbitration are questionable.
Such claims are routinely pleaded, but seldom proven, and yet the
ing discipline for non-payment of an award. See NASD 19-b-4 Proposed Rule Change,
File No. SR-NASD-89-47, Amendment No. 1 at 12 (hereinafter NASD 19-b-4).
239. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962-1964 (1982). Treble damages are allowed under a RICO
claim. See generally Abrams, Civil RICO's Cause of Action: The Landscape After
Sedima, 12 TULANE MAR. L. J. 19 (1988) [hereinafter Abrams]; see also Katsoris I, supra
note 12, at 368 n.52.
240. Seegenerally supra notes 151-55 and accompanying text.
241'. See Morris, Arbitration At The New York Stock Exchange, SECURITIES ARBITRA-
TION PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 95, 119 (Nov. 17, 1989) (available at Fordham Urban
Law Journal office).
242. See Katsoris I, supra note 12, at 368.
243. See Rico v. Rico (Editorial) Wall St. J., Dec. 14, 1989, at A22, col. 1; RICO's
Taxing Problem, Wall St. J., Aug. 22, 1989, at A14, col. 3; RICO: The Law as Thug
(Letter to Editor) Wall St. J., Nov. 13, 1989, at All, col. 1; Uncertain Future For RICO
Cases, Business and the Law, N.Y. Times, Nov. 13, 1989, at D2, col 1; High Powered Bid
to Gut RICO Law Is Derailed By Unrelated Scandals, Backers' Seeming Greed, Wall St.
J., Nov. 9, 1989, at A18, col. 1. It is interesting to note the following pro and anti RICO
lobbies:
For Proposed RICO limits:
* National Association of Manufacturers
* AFL-CIO
* American Civil Liberties Union
* American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
* American Bar Association
* American Bankers Association
* Securities Industry Association
* American Life League (anti-abortion group)
* Defendants in pending civil RICO cases
Against proposed RICO limits:
* Public Citizen (Ralph Nader consumer group)
* U.S. Public Interest Research Group (state consumer groups)
* National Association of Insurance Commissioners
* National Association of Attorneys General
* National Association of Securities and Commercial Law Attorneys
(plaintiffs' lawyers)
* Plaintiffs in pending RICO cases.
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mere allegation clearly bogs down the arbitration proceeding. 24  For
that reason, the application of RICO in securities matters should be
narrowed, leaving punishment, the goal of treble damages, to be doled
out in the form of punitive damages and SRO discipline.
The issue of the awardability of punitive damages, however, is in
itself problematic. There are those who argue that arbitrators cannot
award punitive damages, citing cases such as the New York Court of
Appeals' decision in Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc.,245 particularly when
the arbitration agreement contains a New York choice of law provi-
2461farirsion. If arbitration is to be a viable alternative to court litigation,
however, it cannot be used as a procedure to strip claimants of reme-
dies. Accordingly, punitive damages should be uniformly allowed, al-
beit in a national system of SRO arbitration, so as to eliminate the
inequitable effect of some choice of law provisions. 247 On the other
hand, if such restrictive provisions become common practice, and are
given effect by the courts, then the issue of adhesion in the context of
pre-dispute arbitration agreements should be reexamined by the
courts.
2 4 s
Section 29-Agreement to Arbitrate 2
49
This section (previously numbered 30 and captioned "Miscellane-
244. As to the complexities of RICO, see generally Abrams, supra note 239.
245. 40 N.Y.2d 354, 353 N.E.2d 793, 386 N.Y.S.2d 831 (1976). The New York Court
of Appeals held that an arbitrator had no power to award punitive damages. "The law
does not and should not permit private persons to submit themselves to punitive sanc-
tions of the order reserved to the [sitate." Id. at 360, 353 N.E.2d at 797, 386 N.Y.S.3d at
834.
246. I.e., a provision in an agreement that says New York law applies. See Punitive
Damages: On Trial, 2 SEC. ARB. COMMENTATOR 4 (Feb. 1989). Even in the New York
federal courts, where Garrity "remains the home state's rule, the cases are divided." Id.
247. See Stipanowich, Punitive Damages in Arbitration: Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc.
Reconsidered, 65 B.U.L. REV. 953 (1986); D. Robbins, A Practitioner's Guide To Securi-
ties Arbitration, Securities Arbitration 1989, PLI seminar at 183. But see Volt Informa-
tion Serv. Inc. v. Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 109 S. Ct. 1248
(1989). In Volt, the Supreme Court recognized a choice of law clause providing that the
contract would be governed by the law of" 'the place where the [p]roject is located.' "Id.
at 1251 (citation omitted); see also Punitive Damages-What are the Limits?, 2 SEC. ARB.
COMMENTATOR 7 (Aug. 1989).
248. See Katsoris II, supra note 16, at 306-09; see also supra note 28. Moreover, in
view of the Volt decision, supra note 247, it is uncertain what effect the amendment to
§ 31 of the Code (see infra notes 260-68)--which prohibits any limitation upon the arbi-
trators' ability to make any award-will have upon clauses prohibiting punitive damages.
In the final analysis, it may have to be Congress that effects a trade-off in securities arbi-
tration by limiting RICO claims in exchange for a national recognition of punitive dam-
ages awards.
249. Uniform Code of Arbitration § 29, infra at 499 (Appendix B).
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ous") 2 50 was renumbered 29 after McMahon ,251 but has remained vir-
tually unchanged since its inception. It simply incorporated the Code
by reference into every duly executed submission agreement, which
shall be binding on all parties.252 After the Sixth Report, however,
SICA amended Section 29, changing the title from "Miscellaneous"
to "Agreement to Arbitrate," and extending the automatic incorpora-
tion of the Code to agreements to arbitrate.253 Thus, the present sec-
tion ensures that a party who does not sign a submission agreement is
still bound by the provisions of the Uniform Code.254
Section 30-Schedule of Fees for Customer Disputes255
Section 30 (previously numbered 31)256 provided for the schedule of
fees in customer disputes. These fees have varied since the original
Code. After McMahon the section was amended to specifically define
a hearing session.2 5' Furthermore, the section now allows the arbitra-
tors to award additional costs beyond hearing session charges in their
decisions.258 After the Sixth Report, SICA further amended Section
30(e) so that it now also provides: "[i]n any matter settled or with-
drawn within [eight] business days prior to the first scheduled hearing
session, the SRO may retain the amount deposited as forum fees or a
portion thereof. This section shall not apply to [small] claims filed
under Section 2 of this Code. '259
Section 31-Requirements When Using Pre-Dispute Arbitration
Agreements With Customers26 0
This section is new to the Code.261 It provides that any pre-dispute
arbitration clause be highlighted and immediately preceded by certain
disclosure language that describes arbitration and its effect.262 The
impetus behind this addition was legislative pressure to render unen-
forceable pre-dispute arbitration clauses.263
250. See SECOND REPORT, supra note 68, at A- 1i.
251. See SIXTH REPORT, supra note 49, at 11.
252. See FIFTH REPORT, supra note 56, at 36-37.
253. See SIXTH REPORT, supra note 49, at 11; see also Uniform Code of Arbitration
§ 29, infra at 499 (Appendix B).
254. Id.
255. Id. § 30.
256. See FIFTH REPORT, supra note 56, at 37-38.
257. See SIXTH REPORT, supra note 49, at 11-12.
258. Id.
259. Uniform Code of Arbitration § 30(e), infra at 500 (Appendix B).
260. Id. § 31.
261. See SIXTH REPORT, supra note 49, at 12.
262. See Uniform Code of Arbitration § 3 1(1), infra at 500-01 (Appendix B).
263. See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text; see also Hoblin II, supra note 22, at
52-57 (Supp. 1988). California had proposed a statute that would restrict arbitration
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This SICA rule also provides that immediately preceding the signa-
ture line there shall be a statement, which shall be highlighted and
separately initialled by the customer, that the agreement contains a
pre-dispute arbitration clause. 26 4 Despite approval by SICA, no SRO
has approved this requirement as to separate initialling.265 Conse-
quently, such a requirement does not appear in their arbitration rules.
This is regrettable, because from the point of view of the customer
and the broker, separate initialling more clearly calls the arbitration
clause to the customer's attention. Moreover, an initialling require-
ment would likely reduce the amount of litigation based upon the cus-
tomer's lack of awareness of the clause.
What makes the industry response to Section 31 even more puz-
zling is that in inserting this requirement, SICA never intended that
failure to initial would void any agreement to arbitrate. On the con-
trary, violations would only result in possible disciplinary action
against the offending broker. Furthermore, in order to prevent the
insertion of restrictive clauses in customers' agreements that would
conflict with the provisions of the Code, Section 31 also specifically
prohibits conditions that limit or contradict the rules of the SROs, or
limit the ability of a party to file any claim in arbitration or limit the
ability, of the arbitrators to make any award.2 6 6
Since Section 31 is new, it includes a grandfather clause, which
states that the requirements of the section shall apply only prospec-
tively to new agreements signed by an existing or new customer after
120 days have elapsed from the date of SEC approval of the rule. 267
Thus, a broker-dealer who thereafter attempts to limit contractually a
customer's right to select any of the available SROs, might be subject
to disciplinary action by any SRO that has adopted Section 31, of
which it is a member.268
C. The SRO Codes
The Uniform Code of Arbitration represents a major step in the
development of securities arbitration as a fair, economical and expedi-
tious dispute resolution process. It also represents a significant effort
(McCorguodale Committee), and that Committee agreed that if SICA adopted disclosure
rules comparable to theirs, they would withdraw the proposal. Id. As SICA did adopt
the disclosure rules, the proposal was presumably withdrawn. Id.
264. See SIXTH REPORT, supra note 49, at 12.
265. For a comparison of different SROs, see infra at 502-03 (Appendix C).
266. See SIXTH REPORT, supra note 49, at 12.
267. Id.; see also Uniform Code of Arbitration § 31(5), infra at 501 (Appendix B).
268. For an example of such disciplinary authority, see NASD Code of Procedures,
Art. IV, § 1, in NASD Manual, (CCH) 3049, at 3151.
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to make the SRO securities arbitration rules uniform throughout the
country.
A chart which generally tracks the Code provisions into the sepa-
rate code sections of the various SROs is attached to this Article as
Appendix C.2 69 It should be noted, however, that once SICA adopts
a new rule, each SRO must then generally go back to their respective
organization in order to get a rule change which is then usually sub-
mitted to the SEC for approval.270 Accordingly, there is often a time
lag between SICA approval and SRO action, with the result that the
SRO codes do not always mirror the SICA Code.2 7 '
Adding to the confusion are inconsistencies that exist between the
various SROs regarding implementation or interpretation of the
SICA rules. For example, the NYSE uses one arbitrator when the
amount of the claim involves $10,000 or less, whereas the NASD has
adopted a one arbitrator rule in claims up to $30,000.272 Another ex-
ample is the different application of award collection procedures.273
The general rule requires an award to be paid within thirty days, with
no escrow provision, while the MSRB cuts that down to twenty days
and imposes escrow features.274 Still another example is the order of
closing arguments. The ASE and the NYSE procedures provide that
the claimant closes last, whereas the NASD provides for the claimant
to close first.275 Yet another inconsistency in SRO procedures is the
handling of consolidation and joinder. Some SROs will accept a join-
der at the time of filing, with the objecting party then moving to sever,
while one SRO required that separate claims be filed, with the parties
then moving to consolidate. 76 In addition, the form of the award
269. See infra at 502-03 (Appendix C).
270. See Katsoris I, supra note 12, at 364.
271. See infra at 502-03 (Appendix C).
272. See supra notes 92-97; see also Wynn, Seminar Highlights: "Securities Arbitration
Update," SEC. ARB. COMMENTATOR 7 (Oct. 1989).
273. See Uniform Code of Arbitration § 28, infra at 498 (Appendix B).
274. See supra notes 235-38 and accompanyifg text.
275. See Arbitration at the American Stock Exchange, Appendix D, SECURITIES AR-
BITRATION 1989 at 621;,see also When Naivete Meets Wall Street, N.Y. Times, Dec. 3,
1989, § 3 (Business), at 1, col. 4 [hereinafter When Naivete Meets Wall Street I.
As for the NASD's shift, Peter R. Celia, a New York lawyer who serves on an industry
arbitration oversight panel, condemned the move, which enables brokerages to offer sum-
maries of their cases last. He said it is 'a radical departure' from the common law prac-
tice, which gives the last word to the party with the burden of proof, in this case, the
investor." Id. at 6, col. 5.
276. See Hoblin I, supra note 19, at 4 n.5. But see SICA's recent amendment to subdi-
vision (d)(2) of the Uniform Code of Arbitration § 13, supra note 161 and accompanying
text.
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varies among the SROs.2" Finally, because each SRO experiences
differing budget constraints, separate fee schedules may surface in an
attempt to close the deficit gap.27 8
These inconsistencies279 can lead to confusion or forum shopping,
and to the extent possible, should be eliminated, because such differ-
ences defeat the goal of uniformity that SICA sought to accomplish in
creating the Code.28
IV. The Arbitrators
The task of achieving a level playing field would be unfinished with-
out focusing on the quality and integrity of the arbitrators who ad-
minister it. Indeed, even the slightest appearance that the deciding
panels were "stacked" in favor of the securities industry would render
the present system of securities arbitration useless. It is for this rea-
son securities arbitrators have come under so much scrutiny over the
past few years.
We must understand, at the outset, that good arbitrators do not
grow on trees. Similarly, they are also not potted plants. Thus, in
weighing the practicality of many of the suggestions discussed above
regarding arbitration procedure, consideration must also be given as
to whether they discourage intelligent, honest and knowledgeable ar-
bitrators from serving.2"' Such consideration is especially urgent in
light of the continuing need to recruit and retain the large numbers of
competent arbitrators essential in order to staff hearings at locations
dispersed throughout the country.28 2
Certainly, an arbitrator must be capable and honest. To fashion
such a profile, however, we must also examine such relevant and re-
lated areas as conflicts of interest, training, and evaluation of perform-
ance during the course of an arbitration.
277. See HOBLIN II, supra note 22, at 53-78; see also supra notes 224-28 and accompa-
nying text.
278. See NASD 19-b-4, supra note 238, at 12-16; see also infra note 399.
279. By the time this article is published, one or more of these inconsistencies may
have been eliminated; however, so long as there are separate SRO programs, the potential
for differing interpretations and procedures exists.
280. See supra notes 63-66.
281. As was alluded to above in the discussion at § 18 of the Code pertaining to ad-
journments, procedural abuses such as multiple adjournments inhibit the retention of a
capable pool of arbitrators. See supra notes 175-89 and accompanying text; see also Kat-
sons I, supra note 12, at 380-81.
282. See D. Lipton Study, 1 SEC. ARB. COMMENTATOR 5 (June 1988). "The size of the
arbitrator pools range from about 15 in small cities to more than 500 in major urban
areas. Prospective arbitrators are recommended to the Director of Arbitration and ulti-
mately approved by an oversight committee of the SRO." Id.
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A. Conflicts of Interest
The SICA Procedures Booklet provides that arbitrators are to be
impartial persons who are knowledgeable in the areas in contro-
versy.28 3 Each sponsoring organization maintains a roster of individ-
uals who are not employees of the sponsoring organization but whose
professional qualifications and experience qualify them for service as
arbitrators. 284 The Uniform Code of Arbitration specifically provides
that unless the public customer requests otherwise, the matter will be
arbitrated by a panel "at least a majority of whom shall not be from
the securities industry, '"285 i.e, are public arbitrators.28 6
The Code also safeguards the level playing field through provisions
that are common to all classifications of arbitrators.28 7 These provi-
sions are intended to offer parties an opportunity to challenge panel
members not to their liking2 88 and to insure that arbitrators are free
from conflicts of interest.28 9 In furtherance of this goal, the Code con-
tains disclosure requirements which seek to make challenges more in-
formed and have conflicts of interest issues surface early.29
The selection of arbitrators at SRO forums does not employ the so-
called tri-partite system where basically each party picks an arbitrator
and the two appointees pick a third. Instead, the SRO forums pick
the arbitration panels, consisting of both the public as well as the
industry arbitrators. As mentioned previously, the classification of an
283. See PROCEDURES BOOKLET, supra note 65, at 3.
284. Id.
285. See Uniform Code of Arbitration § 8, infra at 487-88 (Appendix B). It has been
suggested that arbitration panels should consist only of public members. See SIA,
NASAA Split Over Fairness of Securities Arbitration Procedures, Sec. Reg. & L. Rep.
(BNA) No. 20, at 870 (June 10, 1988); Seeking 'Fairness'in Brokers'Disputes, N.Y. Daily
News, June 26, 1988, at 10 (Business), col. 1). The principal problem with this sugges-
tion, is that in eliminating arbitrators affiliated with the securities industry, it would also
eliminate sources of invaluable insight into the workings of the securities industry from
the arbitration panels. In addition, the adoption of such exclusionary rule would un-
doubtedly be perceived by the industry as stacking the deck in favor of the investors.
This is particularly significant, because if the industry loses faith in the feasibility of arbi-
tration, it is likely that the industry would seek to avoid its use. If avoidance of arbitra-
tion became the rule and not the exception, the interests of public investors would
generally not be well served. See, e.g., the discussion of the additional costs and time
required in resolving disputes via litigation, supra notes 16, 79-83 and accompanying text.
286. See supra notes 116-24 and accompanying text.
287. See Uniform Code of Arbitration §§ 9-12 infra at 488-90 (Appendix B). For a
discussion of these sections, see supra notes 125-50 and accompanying text.
288. See supra notes 134-38 and accompanying text.
289. See supra notes 139-43 and accompanying text.
290. Id.
291. Morris, Arbitrator Assignment-The Case for Agency Selection, 2 SEC. ARB. COM-
MENTATOR 1, 3 (Feb. 1989).
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arbitrator as industry or public is basically a mechanical test.292 Once
classified and so selected, however, the distinction between industry
and public disappears. From that point on, both have a similar duty
to hear and decide the controversy fairly and with an open mind.293
In this context, both must be free from bias and prejudice as well as
any circumstances evidencing a conflict of interest.294
Disqualification for bias or prejudice may occur when the arbitra-
tor, through overt acts, has shown he is unable to render a fair deci-
sion. Disqualification for conflicts of interest, however, is more apt to
be based upon the premise that in spite of no overt act of wrongdoing,
the arbitrator may not be objective in his judgment because of his
conflicting interest. Consequently, the standard of such disqualifica-
tion for conflict is not always crystal clear. To avoid subsequent
problems, disclosure of potential conflicts should be made early and
promptly, and it is precisely for this reason that the disclosure rules of
the Code seek early disclosure and notification.295 Moreover, if there
is any doubt whether to disclose or not, it is wisest to disclose.
It is often difficult to determine when a present or prior relationship
creates a conflict which should disqualify an arbitrator from sitting on
a panel. The circumstances may vary and often hinge on a question of
degree and judgment. An excellent beginning is the Code of Ethics
for Arbitrators in Commercial Disputes,296 which provides:
arbitrators 'should err on the side of disclosure' because 'it is better
that the relationship be disclosed at the outset when the parties are
free to reject the arbitrator or accept him with knowledge of the
relationship.' At the same time, it must be recognized that 'an ar-
bitrator's business relationships may be diverse indeed, involving
more or less remote commercial connections with great numbers of
people.' Accordingly, an arbitrator 'cannot be expected to provide
the parties with his complete and unexpurgated business biogra-
phy,' nor is an arbitrator called upon to disclose interests or rela-
292. See supra notes 115-24 and accompanying text.
293. Uniform Code of Arbitration §§ 9, 10, 11 and 12 apply to all arbitrators in the
same way. See supra notes 125-50 and accompanying text. Only § 8, the selection rule,
distinguishes between public and industry arbitrators. See supra notes 115-24 and accom-
panying text.
294. See Uniform Code of Arbitration § 11 infra at 489-90 (Appendix B); see also
supra notes 139-43 and accompanying text.
295. See the Uniform Code of Arbitration §§ 9, 11 infra at 488-90 (Appendix B); see
also supra notes 125-33, 139-43 and accompanying text.
296. CODE OF ETHICS FOR ARBITRATORS IN COMMERCIAL DISPUTES [hereinafter
CODE OF ETHICS]. This code was created by a Joint Committee consisting of a Special
Committee of the American Arbitration Association and a Special Committee of the
American Bar Association in 1977. See Coulson, Securities Arbitration at the American
Arbitration Association, SECURITIES ARBITRATION 1989, PLI SEMINAR 683, 723.
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tionships which are merely 'trivial.'297
As helpful as the statement is, it may still be unclear as to when its
application would disqualify an arbitrator for having an interest or
relationship that is likely to affect impartiality, or that might create an
appearance of partiality or bias.
As a starting point, it might seem appropriate to ascribe to arbitra-
tors the same standards applied to judges298 because both decide cases
297. Canon II, CODE OF ETHICS, supra note 296, at 7 (quoting Commonwealth Coat-
ings Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co., 393 U.S. 145, 151-52 (1968)).
298. The conduct of judges is largely governed by the American Bar Association's
Cannons of Judicial Ethics, which was adopted by Congress when it set down the stan-
dard for disqualification of federal judges. See 28 U.S.C. § 455 (1982). The statute pro-
vides in pertinent part:
(a) [a]ny justice, judge, or magistrate of the United States shall disqualify him-
self in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be
questioned.
(b) He shall also disqualify himself in the following circumstances:
(1) Where he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party or per-
sonal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the
proceeding;
(2) Where in private practice he served as lawyer in the matter in contro-
versy, or a lawyer with whom he previously practiced law served dur-
ing such association as a lawyer concerning the matter, or the judge
or such lawyer has been a material witness concerning it;
(3) Where he has served in governmental employment and in such ca-
pacity participated as counsel, adviser or material witness concerning
the proceeding or expressed an opinion concerning the merits of the
particular case in controversy;
(4) He knows that he, individually or as a fiduciary, or his spouse or
minor child residing in his household, has a financial interest in the
subject matter in controversy or in a party to the proceeding, or any
other interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome of
the proceeding;
(5) He or his spouse, or a person within the third degree of relationship
to either of them, or the spouse of such a person;
(i) Is a party to the proceeding, or an officer, director, or trustee of
a party;
(ii) Is acting as a lawyer in the proceeding;
(iii) Is known by the judge to have an interest that could be sub-
stantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding;
(iv) Is to the judge's knowledge likely to be a material witness in the
proceeding....
(d) For the purposes of this section the following words'or phrases shall have
the meaning indicated ...
(4) "financial interest" means ownership of a legal or equitable interest,
however small, or a relationship as director, adviser, or other active
participants in the affairs of a party, except that:
(i) ownership in a mutual or common investment fund that holds
securities is not a (financial interest) in such securities unless the
judge participates in the management of the fund; . ..
(e) No justice, judge, or magistrate shall accept from the parties to the pro-
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brought before them. Unlike full-time judges, however, arbitrators
are usually only part-time arbitrators. Indeed, they spend most of
their time in other occupations, often in the same industry or trade
involved in the litigation.2 99 In addition, the judicial forum is fur-
nished by the government itself, and therefore presumably it is neu-
tral. In contrast, SRO arbitrations are conducted at a forum which is
supported by the securities industry itself,3" thus leading many public
claimants to perceive it with greater concern and suspicion.
Because of these fundamental differences between SRO arbitration
and courtroom litigation, the standards as to securities arbitrators
would appear to be, and indeed should be stricter. For example, a
judge who was a former prosecutor for a good part of his life, would
not necessarily be precluded from presiding over a criminal case, but
in SRO securities arbitration, the majority of the arbitrators must not
be from the securities industry.3"' For some, the taint of former se-
curities involvement could disqualify them as a public arbitrator for-
ever. 302 Moreover, even the spouse of an industry person usually does
not qualify as either a public or securities arbitrator,30 3 whereas a
judge would not generally be disqualified from banking cases merely
because his spouse is employed at an unrelated bank.
It is difficult under any circumstance, however, to reconcile arbitra-
tion ethics with judicial ethics, which permits both the trial and appel-
late judges to hear cases presented by attorneys who made substantial
contributions to their election campaigns."a° If such conduct oc-
ceeding a waiver for any ground for disqualification enumerated in subsec-
tion (b). Where the ground for disqualification arises only under
subsection (a), waiver may be accepted provided it is preceded by a full
disclosure on the record of the basis of disqualification.
28 U.S.C. 455 (1982).
The language in § 455 is nearly identical to the language of Canon 3(C) of the Code of
Judicial Conduct, entitled Disqualification, S. GILLERS & N. DORSON, REGULATION OF
LAWYERS: PROBLEMS OF LAW AND ETHICS 597 (§ VIII(f)) (1985) [hereinafter S. GIL-
LERS]. Beyond § 455, 28 U.S.C. § 144 requires district court judges to recuse themselves
in the event of personal bias or prejudice against or in favor of any party. 28 U.S.C. § 144
(1982); GILLERS, supra, at 597.
299. Roughly one-third of SRO public securities arbitration panels consist of industry
arbitrators. See supra notes 115-21.
300. See supra notes 52-78.
301. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
302. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
303. Id.
304. See U.S. Orders Texas to Restructure the Way Its Judges are Elected, Wall St. J.,
Nov. 11, 1989, at B6, col. 2; see also The Plaintiff Attorney's Great Honey Rush, Forbes,
Oct. 16, 1989, at 197, 199.
Where judges are elected, the role of the plaintiff attorneys has become notori-
ous: campaign contributions. In Texas, the fundraising drive supported by Joe
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curred in SRO arbitration, however, there would be a Congressional
inquiry, and rightly so.
Although a stricter standard is clearly warranted in the case of
SRO arbitrators, some relationships are so obscure that even disclo-
sure of a relationship is ridiculous. For example, if an arbitrator
shops at Sears, he should not have to reveal that if he sits on a case
where Dean-Witter is a party.3"5 Similarly, if he has an American
Express card, he should not be compelled to reveal that, if he arbi-
trates a dispute involving Shearson. °6 Such revelations would be lu-
dicrous. Otherwise, an SRO arbitrator would turn into a recluse who
could speak or interact with no one. Such a result would be wholly
impractical, and only another recluse would want such an arbitrator.
In essence, it is necessary to avoid requirements of disclosure and dis-
qualification that are so extreme that they discourage or eliminate
otherwise capable arbitrators.
What then should be revealed, and when should that result in dis-
qualification? Although reasonable people may differ and conclusions
might vary depending on differing circumstances, a few personal ob-
servations and judgments seem appropriate.307
1. Relationship with Parties or Their Attorneys
An arbitrator should not sit on a case involving his own firm or
close relative as a party. Similarly, an arbitrator should not sit on a
case involving a present client as a party. In a case involving a prior
client, the arbitrator should be presumed biased, but disqualification
would ultimately depend upon surrounding circumstances. 30 8
Another potentially problematic situation is when a public arbitra-
tor has a small securities account with a large brokerage house which
is appearing before him. This is close, but it is probably not a case for
automatic disqualification, because prejudice or bias could go either
way in such a relationship. The relationship, however, should cer-
tainly be revealed, and as a practical matter, most SRO Arbitration
Jamail and Pat Maloney ($6 million) was so successful that, according to one
Texas attorney, 'until last year the plaintiff bar owned and controlled the Texas
Supreme Court.' Maloney is confident that 1988's election reversal will be cor-
rected in 1990: '[w]e are resilient, and we will bounce back.'
Id.
305. Dean Witter is a subsidiary of Sears.
306. Shearson is a subsidiary of American Express.
307. These observations are largely the product of experience as a public arbitrator.
Consequently, they are for the most part given without supporting footnotes.
308. The presumption is that a person who was once a client, is always a potential
client.
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Directors would wisely avoid the issue and not appoint the arbitrator
in such a case.
More troublesome is the situation where an attorney sits as an arbi-
trator in one case, and then subsequently represents claimants or re-
spondents before other panels at the same SRO. This is somewhat
akin to a sitting judge appearing before his fellow judges. Certainly
attorneys who also sit as securities arbitrators should avoid appearing
before arbitrators with whom they have served as fellow arbitrators
on previous cases. In any event, that fact should certainly be
disclosed.
A somewhat related situation was involved in Jenkins v.
Sterlacci,a09 where an attorney (X) was representing a litigant against
another who was represented by a particular law firm (Y), and Y was
also representing a different party in a totally unrelated proceeding in
which X was the special master.31 Thus, in relation to the other law
firm, X served as both an adversary and an adjudicator. After noting
that a substantial question was raised whether the Special master
should have been disqualified on the basis that these activities raised
the "appearance" of a conflict of interest, the court concluded that
based on other facts in the case, such objection had been waived.31'
Finally, the cumulative effect of isolated relationships can also be-
come problematical. An example would be if an arbitrator and one of
the parties had gone to the same grade school, belonged to the same
golf club, took the same commuting train every morning, belonged to
the same church and worked for the same conglomerate. In such a
case, clearly the wisest course would be for the arbitrator to excuse
himself and sit on another case.
Even though there is an endless variety of conflicts of interest, se-
curities arbitrators should not be paranoid. After all, not every rela-
tionship results in disqualification. The arbitrator can disclose the
relationship, and then independently determine whether to disqualify
himself. In addition, following disclosure, the parties may choose not
to object and allow the arbitrator to continue to sit on their case. In
sum, disqualification is not always automatic.
2. Relationship with Witnesses
Before leaving this topic, it should also be pointed out that similar
compromising relationships can also surface (although not as often)
309. 849 F.2d 627 (D.C. Cir. 1988); see also Suite Sharing, Arbitrator's Friendship With
Winning Lawyer Imperils Huge Victory, Wall St. J., Feb. 14, 1990, at Al, col. 1.
310. Jenkins v. Sterlacci, 849 F.2d 627, 629-30.
311. Id. at 630-34.
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between an arbitrator and a witness of one of the parties. This troub-
lesome connection should be avoided. For example, if used only as a
character or expert witness, the burden of finding another one would
be less objectionable than removing the arbitrator. Thus, a balancing
of the equities would not seem to dictate the removal of the arbitrator
in such a situation. On the other hand, if a fact witness is involved,
the result will depend on how vital that testimony is: if it is only
duplicative and superfluous, then the arbitrator should remain;3"2 if,
however, that witness's testimony is absolutely essential, then serious
consideration must be given to removing the arbitrator. Fortunately,
however, the new SICA rules provide for the filling of such a vacancy
and letting the arbitration proceed.3" 3
Accordingly, at the time the parties consider whether to challenge
an arbitrator3 4 they should discuss with their witnesses the possibility
of a witness/arbitrator conflict. If one exists, it is best for all con-
cerned that it surface and be dealt with early in the arbitration
process.
3. Other Conflicts
Recently, an interesting form of conflict has cropped up in situa-
tiorrs where an arbitrator--either in pre-hearing proceedings3" 5 or
during the hearing316must examine sensitive material, in camera,
with a view to whether it should be produced or admitted into evi-
dence. After such inspection and ruling of non-production or inad-
missibility, a challenge is then often asserted against the arbitrator
who conducted the inspection on the ground that his mind has al-
ready been poisoned by the excluded materials he has examined. Un-
less the arbitrator felt he could not thereafter be impartial, however,
such motion for disqualification should normally be denied.3" 7
312. Whether the witness testifies depends on the circumstances, but it would probably
be wisest for the offering party to get the opposition's consent.
313. See supra notes 148-50 and accompanying text.
314. See supra notes 134-38 and accompanying text.
315. See supra notes 188-202 and accompanying text.
316. See supra notes 203-05 and accompanying text.
317. Judges continue to sit in such situations all the time, and we should expect no less
of arbitrators as to their ability to proceed impartially thereafter. In addition, if an arbi-
trator had to be replaced in every such situation, it would render arbitration virtually
useless as an effective means of resolving disputes, for it would mean that in most arbitra-
tions, at least one new arbitrator would have to be appointed in the course of the arbitra-
tion. This would of course greatly increase the length of time required for the completion
of the arbitration, resulting in an escalation in costs.
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B. Evaluation of Arbitrators
It is the obligation of the SROs to recruit, train and retain a diversi-
fied pool of competent arbitrators. 318 This requires some sort of eval-
uation process so as to enable the SRO to weed out arbitrators who
may not be performing well. It should be done, however, in a digni-
fied and professional manner so as not to intimidate, insult or other-
wise embarrass sitting arbitrators.3 9 The evaluation process should
also not become a popularity contest initiated by parties who may be
either jubilant or disgruntled after an award.
Before McMahon, this evaluation process was done informally by
the SRO staffs. After McMahon, SICA undertook to expand the pro-
cess by involving a broader spectrum of input. SICA decided on a
three-pronged evaluation, which includes: (1) evaluations done by the
party/representatives; (2) evaluations by the arbitrators' peers on the
panel; and (3) evaluations by the SRO staffs.) 2° To be meaningful,
however, each of these evaluations must be administered under differ-
ing conditions and with correspondingly different safeguards. For ex-
ample, it is preferable that the party/representative evaluations be
made before an award is rendered.3 ' In the case of peer review, it
was concluded it would best be done after the award was rendered.32 2
As for the SRO staff review, SICA decided that it could be done at
any time during the course of arbitration.3 23
The purpose of the program is to evaluate arbitrators with a view
toward ensuring that the roster of arbitrators only includes highly
qualified individuals.3 24  Accordingly, since the data contained in
these evaluations is often sensitive, it should be reviewed only by se-
nior members of the SRO staffs, and used exclusively in aid of the
318. A national SRO such as the NYSE has thousands of arbitrators. It obtains their
names from bar associations, community groups, and existing arbitrators. Others are
referred by securities organizations or governmental agencies. Generally, the arbitrators
are grouped by city and are asked to serve in a major commercial center close to their
home or business. Only rarely is an SRO arbitrator asked to travel. See Morris, Arbitra-
tor Assignment-The Case for Agency Selection, 2 SEC. ARB. COMMENTATOR 2 (Feb.
1989).
319. The key is that we do not want to discourage good, capable arbitrators from serv-
ing. See, e.g., supra notes 175-85, 281-82 and accompanying text; see also Katsoris I,
supra note 12, at 376-81.
320. 2 SEC. ARB. COMMENTATOR 1, 4 (Nov. 1989).
321. In that way, the evaluations are likely to be less partisan, because they will not be
tainted by the emotion of victory or defeat.
322. The peer evaluations are most informative when they take into account observa-
tions made throughout the arbitration including the deliberative process.
323. Staff must make their evaluations whenever they can, because unlike peers, they
do not sit in on deliberations, and are often absent from the hearings.
324. See generally Katsoris I, supra note 12, at 379-80.
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administration of the arbitration departments. The evaluations,
therefore, will not be available to the parties, because public disclo-
sure would be counter-productive in that it would discourage many
fine arbitrators from serving, and could even invite defamation litiga-
tion.325 Moreover, public disclosure of the evaluations would surely
lead to appeals32 6 on the ground that a particular arbitrator should
not have been appointed because some of his evaluations were medio-
cre or poor. In any event, the SRO evaluation performance is not
without safeguards-it is subject to the oversight of the SEC.3 27
C. Training of Arbitrators
Prior to the McMahon decision, the typical securities arbitration
claim involved churning, unauthorized trading or unsuitability.328
Subsequently, arbitrators have often had to resolve complex claims
involving Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act and related rules,329 treble
damages under RICO33° and punitive damages.33' In addition, arbi-
trators have to rule on such thorny pre-hearing issues as discovery,
arbitration preclusion, res judicata, collateral estoppel, joinder, sever-
ance and consolidation.332 It is imperative, therefore, that arbitrators
receive more extensive training, especially since in the future, more
and more arbitrations will probably be conducted without a staff ad-
ministrator present. 333
Positive steps have been taken to ensure that arbitrators are able to
live up to the high expectations that have been placed on them by
investors. In this regard both of the two largest SROs, the NASD and
the NYSE, have held arbitration training sessions. 334 In addition, sig-
325. Id. at 381.
326. For a discussion of appeals, see supra note 234.
327. For a discussion of SEC oversight, see infra notes 370-74 and accompanying text.
328. See Katsoris I, supra note 12, at 379.
329. See generally Thel, The Original Conception of Section 10(b) of the Securities Ex-
change Act, 42 STAN. L. REV. 385 (1990).
330. See generally Abrams, supra note 239, at 41-45.
331. For a discussion of punitive damages in the context of arbitration, see supra notes
245-48 and accompanying text; see also generally, Shell, ERISA and Other Federal Em-
ployment Statutes: When is Commercial Arbitration an Adequate Substitute For the
Courts?, 68 TEX. L. REV. 3 (1990).
332. The issue of joinder and consolidation raises the difficult question of whether the
possibility of substantial prejudice arising from such consolidation or joinder outweighs
the "time and expense involved in separate actions or the possibility of conflicting
awards." Stipanowich, Arbitration and the Multiparty Dispute: the Search for Workable
Solutions, 72 IOWA L. REV. 473, 489-90 (1987).
333. See Morris, Arbitration At The New York Stock Exchange, SECURITIES ARBITRA-
TION PRACTICE AND PROCEDURES SEMINAR 114 (Nov. 17, 1989) [hereinafter Morris].
334. See Masucci, supra note 120, at 143; see also SIXTH REPORT, supra note 49, at 2-
1990]
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL
nificant contributions toward arbitrator training have come in the
form of publications. A news letter specifically dedicated to the sub-
ject of securities arbitration is already in print.335 Other publications
dealing with arbitration are also available.336
Perhaps the most significant publication for arbitrator training has
been SICA's Arbitrator's Manual (Manual) 337 which was developed
to instruct arbitrators concerning their duties and responsibilities. As
is boldly set out in its preface, the Manual was solely designed to be a
guide for arbitrators, supplementing and explaining the Uniform
Code.33 After much debate within SICA, the text of the document
was carefully chosen so as to be instructive and yet fair. Any such
undertaking, however, creates an attractive target for criticism by
competing advocates.
Despite such clear admonition that the Manual was not intended to
restrict a panel's discretion, it has already been criticized as an SRO
Manual having an industry bias. 339 Such criticism ignores the reality
that it is a SICA product, not an SRO effort. Furthermore, the Man-
ual is merely intended to be a general guide for people whose skills
vary, whether they are the new arbitrator on the block, or an attorney
who may be highly skilled and trained in litigation procedures. Ad-
mittedly, the Manual is a product of consensus, yet on balance, it is an
excellent, worthwhile starting point in the training process. More-
over, the Manual is not cast in stone, and SICA has agreed to amend
it on a continuing basis, as the need arises.
More still needs to be done, however, in the area of arbitrator train-
ing. For example, several lecture series could be offered to arbitrators
throughout the country on numerous topics ranging from a basic ar-
bitration procedures course for new inexperienced arbitrators, to one
on substantive law involved in complex claims such as RICO and Sec-
tion 10(b). Lecture series would also be a very good way to keep arbi-
trators abreast of the latest developments in arbitration through
periodic update programs. These lectures could be taped or delivered
3; Masucci & Morris, Arbitration at the NASD and the NYSE, 1989 SECURITIES ARBI-
TRATION, PLI SEMINAR 437, 448. [hereinafter Masucci & Morris].
335. The Securities Arbitration Commentator. (The publication, not any specific
issue).
336. See BNA Alternate Dispute Resolution Report; BNA Securities Regulation and
Law Report.
337. THE ARBITRATOR'S MANUAL (1989) [hereinafter Arbitrator's Manual] (available
at Fordham Urban Law Journal office); see also Masucci & Morris, supra note 334, at
477, and ARBITRATOR'S MANUAL, 2 SEC. ARB. COMMENTATOR 8 (May 1989).
338. Id.
339. See R. Dyer, The SRO Arbitrator's Manual: an Opening Inquiry, Do the SROs
Show an. Industry Bias? 2 SEC. ARB. COMMENTATOR 1 (Aug. 1989).
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live and beamed by satellite to various locations throughout the coun-
try to accommodate the widely dispersed pool of arbitrators. This
type of lecture format has been used quite successfully by the Ameri-
can Law Institute's Continuing Legal Education program 34° on a
wide range of subjects.
Unfortunately, this additional training is burdened by both good
news and bad. The good news is that there will be a better trained
pool of arbitrators more able to cope with the increasingly compli-
cated cases that are resolved through arbitration. The bad news is
that the training will be expensive, and thus may increase the cost of
arbitration for the various SROs.
3 4 1
D. Arbitrators' Confessions
Under the new Code,3 42 arbitrators are scrutinized both as to ability
and background.43  They are carefully selected, classified and evalu-
ated, and then they may be challenged. 344 Their awards are subject to
public scrutiny so that parties can get a sense of each arbitrator's vot-
ing record and leanings.3 45 All these safeguards are constructive and
have their usefulness.
On the other hand, all of these procedures must be viewed in per-
spective, for they can lead to a misleading and unfair impression.
First of all, many awards, whether by juries, judges or arbitrators, are
a result of some consensus or compromise. This, of course, makes an
340. See Fordham Law School Bulletin 1989-90, at 61. Fordham Law School is a
charter affiliate of the American Law Network. Id. As the bulletin instructs:
the American Law Network is a joint effort on the part of the American Law
Institute and the American Bar Association to provide continuing legal educa-
tion programming to members of the American Bar. Courses are conducted by
,prominent legal scholars and transmitted via satellite to TV monitors at the
Law School. This program enables practitioners the opportunity to gain valua-
ble insights on major issues from scholars around the country. Alumni receive
brochures during the year informing them of our programs. This year almost
2,000 attorneys attended our programs.
Id.
341. For a discussion on the escalating cost of arbitration, see infra notes 397-401 and
accompanying text. It is important to note that in the absence of SRO or other subsidiza-
tion, such training will never be fully implemented because the arbitrators can not be
expected to pay for this training. Aside from any financial hardship, such payment would
only seem to discourage capable persons from serving as arbitrators.
342. See UNIFORM CODE OF ARBITRATION, infra at 484 (Appendix B).
343. See id.§ 11, infra at 489-90 (Appendix B); see also supra notes 139-43 and accom-
panying text.
344. See Uniform Code of Arbitration § 10, infra at 489 (Appendix B); see also supra
notes 134-38 and accompanying text.
345. See Uniform Code of Arbitration § 28 infra at 498 (Appendix B); see also supra
notes 226-28 and accompanying text.
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accurate reading of each participant more difficult. Secondly, to char-
acterize an arbitrator as pro-public or pro-industry based upon such
awards does a disservice to the ideal that all arbitrators, public or
industry, are neutral and decide only on the oral and written evi-
dence. Suppose one arbitrator sat on ten consecutive cases where
there was clearly no valid claim; yet, another sat on ten consecutive
cases where there clearly was a claim-what would one expect their
respective "paper" records to be? In the final analysis, the only true
test of an arbitrator's mettle is to check the "record" of each proceed-
ing and not merely the "paper" score. Admittedly, such a process is
much more laborious, but it is fairer and gives a truer reading of the
arbitrator's abilities and impartiality.
Arbitrators are human, however, and consciously or unconsciously,
they may be influenced by their running "paper" record. To what
extent would the ruling in a close case in favor of a public claimant,
influence that arbitrator's decision in the next case, if it also happened
to be close? The answer is the prior ruling should not influence the
arbitrator, but no one will ever know. Therefore, arbitrators should be
reminded that each case is separate and that they must consciously
forget about their paper record to do justice in each individual case.
In addition, whether they sit at an SRO forum(s), the AAA, or
both,346 the arbitrators are by and large honest and decent people, and
for that reason should not allow themselves to be intimidated. They
should not be intimidated by criticism from industry counsel merely
because punitive damages were awarded, or from the plaintiff's bar
simply because the award was much less than what was requested. If
punitive damages are called for,34 7 then they should be assessed, and if
the facts require an award that is only a small percentage of the
amount claimed, that should be the amount of damages granted. 4 If
arbitration is to succeed as an alternative dispute resolution process,
the particular partisan interests or complaints of the parties must re-
main irrelevant to the arbitrator's decision. Accordingly, I would like
to propose349 an Arbitrator's Creed, as follows:
346. Many of the same arbitrators sit at more than one forum-including the AAA.
347. See Recent Punitive Damage Awards, 2 SEC. ARB. COMMENTATOR 6 (May 1989).
348. See When Naivete Meets Wall Street, supra note 275, at 6. Interestingly, a recent
limited study indicated that claimants did better in arbitration. See Letter of J. E. Buck
to Hon. David S. Ruder Oct. 14, 1988 (cited in HOBLIN II, supra note 22, at § 2-12, 5-6).
349. This author has sat as a public arbitrator on approximately 150 SRO arbitrations
over the last 20 years. Over that time, I have dissented in only two awards. I have
agonized over some decisions, but upon reflection, I would not change even one such
award. I do not keep a running record on myself, and in fact, I try to cleanse my mind of
all previous cases when assigned to a new one.
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1) I shall read and become familiar with the Code of Ethics for
Arbitrators.35 ° I will disclose any conflict of interest which
might possibly be perceived as having an effect on my judg-
ment, and I will disqualify myself if such a conflict clearly jeop-
ardizes the perceived fairness of the proceedings.
2) 1 will not be intimidated by partisan threats or criticisms.
3) In reaching my decision, I will exercise the necessary care that
reflects the reality that for all intents and purposes the award
will be the final word on the subject.
4) I will look upon each new case without concern for my "paper"
voting record, and do justice in each case as though it was the
only one I will ever sit on.
E. Consideration for the Arbitrator
Until this point, the focus of this Part has centered for the most
part on what is required of the arbitrator. Much has been discussed
about the necessary, yet sometimes intrusive inquiries regarding the
arbitrator's ability, experience, background and conflicting relation-
ships.35' In addition, arbitrators are evaluated, 52 and expected to un-
dergo training, if necessary.353 Furthermore, it is assumed they will
conduct themselves in an impartial, fair and courteous manner. In
addition, in many instances, their compensation is significantly less
than that earned in their other activities.35 4 Overall, therefore, it is
reasonable to describe their participation in the securities resolution
process as the rendition of a public service.
Accordingly, it is not unreasonable that arbitrators should expect
and are entitled to receive a certain minimum standard of conduct on
the part of those that appear before them. It would seem appropriate,
therefore, to briefly discuss conduct and decorum of attorneys in-
volved in securities arbitration, because their conduct clearly affects
the quality of the playing field over which the arbitrators preside.
As has been noted above with respect to adjournments 35 and pre-
hearing procedures,356 it is crucial that counsel for the parties not
350. See supra notes 296-97 and accompanying text.
351. See supra notes 283-97 and accompanying text.
352. See supra notes 318-27 and accompanying text.
353. See supra notes 328-41 and accompanying text.
354. Indeed, because SRO arbitrators are usually paid by the number of hearing ses-
sions held, this imbalance does not take into consideration the many uncompensated
hours often expended in reading papers before or after such sessions. Nor does it account
for the considerable inconvenience caused by repeated adjournments. See supra notes
175-85 and accompanying text.
355. See supra notes 175-85 and accompanying text.
356. See supra notes 188-202 and gccompanying text.
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abuse these procedures and thereby excessively delay the proceed-
ings. 357 Delay undermines the principal characteristics of arbitration,
i.e., speed, economy and ultimately even fairness. Therefore, the law-
yers' conduct does indeed have a direct effect on the degree to which
the playing field is level. Thus if the arbitration process is to operate
at its best, the lawyers should honor prior commitments to arbitration
with the same degree of respect and concern as they would court
dates.35 To do otherwise is a disservice to the parties and to the
arbitrators.359
Unfortunately, as the number of arbitrations has grown, 360 as the
complexity of the cases has increased, 36' and as the pre-hearing proce-
dures are put into operation, 362 arbitration increasingly resembles
courtroom litigation in tactics and techniques. Thus, it is clearly rea-
sonable to require standards of conduct appropriate in the context of
the courtroom. In that regard, the Texas Supreme Court and the
Court of Criminal Appeals recently adopted the "Texas Lawyer's
Creed-A Mandate for Professionalism" (Texas Creed).3 63 It pro-
vides, in part, that lawyers should endeavour not only to achieve the
lawful objectives of their clients, but to achieve them as quickly and
economically as possible, and in the process, to exercise civility, cour-
tesy, fairness and due consideration with regard to the other parties
and counsel involved. 3' The Texas Creed also emphasizes that the
357. See Katsoris I, supra note 12, at 381.
358. See id.
359. Id.
360. See supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text.
361. See supra notes 328-32 and accompanying text.
362. See supra notes 188-202 and accompanying text.
363. For The Record, N.Y. Times, Dec. 1, 1989, at B7, col. 4.
364. The Texas Creed provides in pertinent part:
Our Legal System
I am passionately proud of my profession. Therefore, "My word is my
bond."
I am responsible to assure that all persons have access to competent repre-
sentation regardless of wealth or position in life.
I commit myself to an adequate and effective pro bono program.
Lawyer to Client
I will endeavor to achieve my client's lawful objectives in legal transac-
tions and in litigation as quickly and economically as possible ...
I will advise my client that civility and courtesy are expected and are not a
sign of weakness ....
I will treat adverse parties and witnesses with fairness and due considera-
tion. A client has no right to demand that I abuse anyone or indulge in
any offensive conduct.
I will advise my client that we will not pursue conduct which is intended
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conduct of the lawyers should be ethical, professional and respectful
of the justice system and its administrators. 365  Finally, the Texas
Creed emphasizes many factors such as speed, economy and fairness,
all of which are of fundamental importance in arbitration. Indeed, the
Texas Creed should also be applicable to arbitration.366 After all, not
only the arbitrators, but the parties themselves must be conscious of
the effect of their actions on the arbitration process, for they too con-
tribute to the ultimate success or failure of the level playing field.
V. The Arbitration Forum
A. The Present Forums: the SROs and the AAA Alternative
In the aftermath of the McMahon decision, most unsettled disputes
between a public customer and his broker are resolved in arbitra-
tion.3 67 The result has been that over 6,000 arbitration cases were
primarily to harass or drain the financial resources of the opposing party
I will advise my client regarding the availability of mediation, arbitration
and other alternative methods of resolving and settling disputes.
Lawyer to Lawyer
I will be courteous, civil and prompt in oral and written communications.
I will not quarrel over matters of form or style, but I will concentrate on
matters of substance ...
I disagree without being disagreeable. I recognize that effective representa-
tion does not require antagonistic or obnoxious behavior. I will neither
encourage nor knowingly permit my client or anyone under my control
to do anything which would be unethical or improper if done by me....
Lawyer and Judge
I will always recognize that the position of judge is the symbol of both the
judicial system and administration of justice. I will refrain from conduct
that degrades this symbol.
I will conduct myself in court in a professional manner and demonstrate
my respect for the court and the law....
I will be punctual.
Id.
365. Id.; see also How's Your Lawyer's Left Jab? Newsweek, Feb. 26, 1990, at 70,
col. 1.
366. Indeed, what if an attorney's conduct in an SRO arbitration proceeding exceeded
the legitimate bounds of heated advocacy? If the client aided, abetted, or joined in such
misconduct, the arbitrators should be able to dismiss the claim (with or without preju-
dice) or make other disposition of the matter, depending on all the circumstances. Also,
in the case of the attorney, the matter could be brought to the attention of the appropriate
bar association for disciplinary inquiry. Finally, it would appear that an SRO has the
inherent right to protect the forum and its participants from abusive conduct by denying
that attorney the right to thereafter practice before that SRO. Stark as such a measure
might be, discretionary abuse is unlikely to occur because the SROs, as well as their
arbitrator forums are subject to the SEC's oversight and regulatory authority.
367. See supra notes 46-51 and accompanying text.
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filed in 1988 with the participating SROs. 6 s In addition, nearly 500
securities cases were also filed in 1988 with the American Arbitration
Association (AAA). 36 9
The AAA is a not-for-profit organization offering a broad range of
dispute resolution services throughout the United States.37 0 Signifi-
cantly, unlike the SRO forums, the AAA is not under the SEC's regu-
latory authority. Partly because of this independence from regulatory
supervision, most arbitration clauses in customers' agreements until
recently only provided for arbitration before one or more SRO fo-
rums.3"' With greater frequency, however, pre-dispute arbitration
clauses have increasingly included the AAA as an alternative forum.
This is largely due to action by the SEC and the Securities Industry
Association (SIA). Adding the AAA as a forum in arbitration agree-
ments was one of the SEC's recommendations in its September 10,
1987 letter to SICA.37 2 The SIA at the behest of the SEC and SICA,
asked member broker-dealers to consider including the AAA as an
alternative forum in customers' agreements.3 73 The SIA has also in-
cluded the AAA in its model customers' agreement.3 7 4
The growing popularity of having an AAA alternative to SRO arbi-
tration appears to be based on several factors. From the SEC's point
of view, the AAA option appears to provide constructive competition
for the SROs, and in addition, the AAA acts as a "safety valve" for
the backlogged SRO forums.3 75 For the SIA, the AAA alternative
undermines the contention that the public is being forced into an in-
dustry sponsored forum and thus enhances the perceived fairness of
the arbitration process.376 From the perspective of the public inves-
tors, an AAA option is an alternative which should exist as a matter
of right.3 77
In spite of the considerable interest in the AAA as an alternative
368. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
369. See Coulson, supra note 234, at 697.
370. See Morris, supra note 333, at 106.
371. See id. at 105-6; Grundfest, Fitterman, McGuire, Love, SEC Initiatives in SRO
Arbitration, 1989 SECURITIES ARBITRATION, PLI SEMINAR 355, 361. Significantly, only
27% of all broker-dealer forums presently include the AAA in their pre-dispute arbitra-
tion clauses. Ryder, 1988: The Year in Review, 1989 SECURITIEs ARBITRATION PRAC-
TICE AND PROCEDURE 41, 43 [hereinafter Ryder].
372. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
373. See 1 SEC. ARB. COMMENTATOR 2 (Dec. 1988).
374. See Ryder, supra note 371, at 43.
375. Id.; see also NASD Backs Single Arbitration Forum; SEC Says Penny Stock
Complaints Rose, 22 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. 6 at 191, Feb. 9, 1990 [hereinafter Single Fo-
rum Backed].
376. Id.
377. " 'If you can't give customers a choice of litigation or arbitration, at least give
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forum, some within the industry continue to resist the AAA.37 s How-
ever, even when the parties have not inserted the AAA into an arbi-
tration clause, securities cases have also found their way into AAA
arbitration through the so-called "AmEx window." '379
The name AmEx window describes the process through which the
American Stock Exchange (ASE) provides a potential "window" for
investors to arbitrate before the AAA.3 0 The ASE Constitution pro-
vides that a customer may arbitrate with a member organization
before the AAA in the City of New York, "unless the customer has
expressly agreed, in writing, to submit only to the arbitration proce-
dures of the Exchange" (waiver provision).3"' Thus, unless the waiver
provision applied, claimants wishing to utilize the AAA could seek to
do so despite having signed an arbitration agreement that does not
provide for AAA as a forum of choice.38 2The unfortunate use of the term "Exchange" in the waiver provi-
sion, however, has led to confusion as to how open the AmEx window
is. 383 If the customer is deemed to have waived his right to AAA
arbitration only if he agreed to be bound solely by ASE arbitration
procedures, then the "window" is wide open. Because few agree-
ments are so restrictive, the customer would have the option to pursue
arbitration before the AAA. On the other hand, if the term "Ex-
change," as used in the waiver provision includes other exchanges or
SROs (as is usually the case), the opposite result is likely to occur. In
that case, the "window" is open only slightly and only in a few in-
stances will the arbitration end up before the AAA. The interpreta-
tion that will prevail is far from certain because lower court decisions
seem split on the subject.384 The ASE has moved to clarify the issue
by amending its constitution by replacing the word "Exchange" with
them the choice of a neutral forum' grumbled Robert Dyer, an attorney in Orlando, Fla."
When Naivete Meets Wall Street, supra note 275, at 6.
378. See Ryder, supra note 371, at 43. As noted above, few broker-dealer firms pres-
ently include the AAA in their pre-dispute agreements, see supra note 371; see also 1 SEC.
ARB. COMMENTATOR 4(b).
379. See Ryder, supra note 371, at 42.
380. Id.; see also ASE Rule Mandates AAA Arbitration, 1 SEC. ARB. COMMENTATOR 3
(May 1988).
381. See ASE CONSTITUTION Art. VIII, § 2 (emphasis added).
382. See Ryder, supra note 371, at 43.
383. Id. "The AmEx Window cases are the ... most numerous representatives of a
new litigation genre .... " Id.
384. See AmEx Window A Foggy Outlook, 2 SEC. ARB. COMMENTATOR 6 (Mar. 1989);
see also "AmEx Window": Shutting Down?, 2 SEC. ARB. COMMENTATOR 4 (June 1989).
But see Cowen & Company v. Jeffrey Anderson, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 6, 1989, at 22, col.5
(N.Y. App. Div., 1st Dep't).
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the words securities industry self-regulatory organizations.385 Such a
change would have the effect of closing the AmEx window because it
would expand the application of the waiver provision.
In the end, only time will tell whether the AAA will garner a larger
share of securities arbitration. 386  The fate of securities arbitration
before the AAA depends on many factors. For one thing, it appears
that AAA costs are higher than those of SRO arbitration.387 More-
over, just as some of the public is leery of SRO arbitration, some in the
securities industry are equally hesitant about AAA arbitration. Nev-
ertheless, despite the cost disadvantage, broker-dealer resistance and
the fact that the AAA is not subject to SEC oversight, the SEC, at
least for now, appears to favor the present system, with the ongoing
competition between the AAA and SRO forums as opposed to a sepa-
rate independent forum under SEC oversight.3 88 Ultimately, the de-
termining factor may be the perceptions of public investors.389
B. A New Independent Forum
The subject of an independent forum was raised by the public mem-
bers of SICA long before McMahon.39 ° Indeed, SICA was seriously
385. See, When Naivete Meets Wall Street, supra note 275; Amex Moves to Close Arbi-
tration 'Window,' Investor's Daily, Dec. 19, 1989, at 1, col. 4; see also Wall Street's Arbi-
tration System: Friend or Foe?, N.Y. Times, Dec. 24, 1989, § 3 (Business), at 12, cols. 5-6
(letters to editor by K. Leibler and T. Eppenstein).
386. In 1988, the AAA had nearly 500 securities case filings, well up from previous
years. See Ryder, supra note 371, at 43-44.
387. See Morris, supra note 333, at 113-14; see also T. Kavaler, Seminar Highlights:
"Securities Arbitration Update," 2 SEC. ARB. COMMENTATOR 9 (Oct. 1989). Moreover,
unlike SRO arbitration the parties in AAA arbitrations pay the arbitrator's fees and other
expenses incurred by the arbitrators or the AAA's representatives, thus making AAA
arbitration even costlier than SRO proceedings. See Rules 48, 49 and 50 of AAA Securi-
ties Arbitration Rules (effective Sept. 1, 1987), reprinted in HoBLIN II, supra note 22, at
XIV-16; see also Masucci & Morris, supra note 334, at 448 (indicating that SRO arbitra-
tors are paid an honorarium by the SROs themselves, not the parties).
388. See supra notes 367-77 and accompanying text.
389. Although recently there has been a significant increase in filings, see Ryder, supra
note 371, at 43-49, the AAA's caselaw is still significantly less than that at the SRO
filings. See infra at 483 (Appendix A). As noted earlier, there are several reasons for
this, namely industry resistance, see supra note 378 and accompanying text, the failure to
include the AAA in the pre-dispute arbitration clauses, see supra note 371 and accompa-
nying text, the lack of SEC oversight, see id., and the additional costs associated with the
AAA, see supra note 387 and accompanying text.
390. See Statement of Constantine N. Katsoris before the Securities & Exchange Com-
mission (Dec. 8, 1977) (available at Fordham Urban Law Journal office):
[t]o insure.., public investments we must retain the public's confidence-confi-
dence in the markets themselves and confidence that should a dispute arise, it
will be fairly resolved. This confidence, however, can only be earned by main-
taining a de facto as well as a de jure image of fairness. In other words, the
procedural rules must be fair and the administration of the forum must be ob-
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considering such a forum before McMahon .391 However, because of
the disenchantment of the SEC, the disagreement among the SROs,
and the presence of the AAA alternative, the concept of a separate
independent forum went into hibernation until recently, when it re-
ceived the support of the SIA.392 SICA has recently endorsed a study
of the feasibility of an independent forum, as well as other alterna-
tives, focusing on the costs of arbitration, funding, legal status and
government oversight of any programs.3 93
The separate independent forum was initially suggested because of
the nagging complaint that the investor was compelled to arbitrate
securities claims "in a forum controlled by the securities industry. '394
Unfortunately, despite the significant efforts of SICA, the SEC and
the SROs themselves,395 this mistrust does not appear to have totally
disappeared.396
Since McMahon, an additional compelling reason has surfaced in
favor of a separate independent securities arbitration forum. That
reason is the escalating costs of arbitration to the SRO forums. 39 7
This is partly so because the more complicated and time consuming
RICO and federal securities violations cases have now been thrust
into arbitration by the McMahon and Rodriquez decisions.398 More-
jective and independent; [moreover] such administration should include public
representation.
391. See Katsoris I, supra note 12, at 384; see also Schropp, New Approaches To Securi-
ties Counselling & Litigation After McMahon, SECURITIES ARBITRATION 1988, PLI Sem-
inar 172 (1988).
392. See Unified Arbitration Forum Under Discussion, 1 SEC. ARB. COMMENTATOR 1
(May 1988) [hereinafter Unified Arbitration Forum Under Discussion]; see also SIA Seeks
Formation ofArbitration Group, Wall St. J., Dec. 22, 1989, at A3A, col. 2; Market Place,
Single Arbitration Agency Is Sought, N.Y. Times, Dec. 21, 1989, at D8, col. 1.
393. SICA decided to endorse such a study at its most recent meeting in San Francisco
in January 1990. N.Y. Times, Jan. 20, 1990, at 34, col. 1.
394. Shearson v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 260 (1987) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
"The uniform opposition of investors to compel arbitration and the. overwhelming sup-
port of the securities industry for the process suggests that there must be some truth to
the investors' belief that the securities industry has an advantage in a forum under its own
control." See When The Investor Has A Gripe, N.Y. Times, Mar. 29, 1987, § 3 (Busi-
ness), at 8, col. 1 ("[t]he houses basically like the present system because they own the
stacked deck").
395. See supra notes 52-78 and accompanying text.
396. See When Naivete Meets Wall Street, supra note 275; see also Traders, on Tape,
Brag About Illegal Trading, Wall St. J., Jan. 9, 1990, at C1, col. 5; Scandals in Chicago,
Automate the Futures Exchanges, N.Y. Times, Dec. 31, 1989, § 3, at 2, col. 3. "[F]ormer
Senator Thomas Eagleton resigned from the Board of Directors of the Chicago Mercan-
tile Exchange, charging that the Exchange is too riddled with cronyism to discipline un-
ethical traders." Id. It should be noted that the Chicago Mercantile Exchange is not a
member of SICA. See supra note 57.
397. See generally Ryder, supra note 371, at 52-55; see also infra note 401.
398. See supra notes 328-32 and accompanying text; see also statements of Constantine
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over, administering the numerous post-MeMahon amendments to the
Code has contributed to the explosion of costs. 399 The costs to the
SROs are likely to increase even more as a result of implementing the
essential programs leading to an intensification of arbitrator training
and education.' Indeed, the aggregate arbitration expenses at com-
peting SRO forums are escalating, with no apparent end in sight.4"1
In the final analysis, all the rules in the world will not insure a level
playing field if the administration of those rules by the host forums is
wanting because of economic constraints." z The demands for securi-
ties arbitration will escalate beyond the abilities of various SRO fo-
rums to fund them adequately. 4 3 Indeed, the globalization of the
securities markets will someday necessitate the addition of several se-
N. Katsoris before the Subcommittee (Markey Committee) on Telecommunications and
Finance of the House Committee on Energy & Commerce (March 31, 1988). Serial No.
100-216-Arbitration Reform at 183-199.
399. See supra notes 79-268, infra note 401 and accompanying text.
400. See supra note 341 and accompanying text.
401. See SEC Release No. 34-26805, May 10, 1989; see also Hoblin I, supra note 19, at
3.
Arbitration has proved to be a very expensive activity for the SRO. In the case
of the NASD, it is a very significant item in 1988 as compared with previous
years. The SEC in Release No. 34-26805, approving SRO rule changes, re-
ported on the cost of SRO arbitration. Footnote 50 of this release gives the
following figures which include rent allocation:
Recovery By
Arbitrators %
SRO Costs Assessment Recovery
NYSE 1987 $ 1,967,000 $ 790,000 40%
1988 2,693,000 1,264,000 47%
NASD 1986/87 4,968,072 402,543 8%
1987/88 7,086,344 1,342,414 19%
AMEX 1987 198,500 46,760 25%
1988 187,000 48,360 26%
The net recovery is reduced due to some arbitrators' unwillingness to assess
costs against either party.
Id. at 5. After McMahon, SICA amended § 30 of the Code so as to specifically authorize
arbitrators to assess forum fees and costs. See supra note 258; see also Market Place,
Single Arbitration Agency Is Sought, N.Y. Times, Dec. 21, 1989, at D8, col. 1. "The
Securities Industry Association has called on Wall Street to set up a single industrywide
agency to handle the arbitration of customer disputes, rather than continuing to maintain
separate programs at various exchanges and at the National Association of Securities
Dealers." Id.
402. Moreover, the budget of the SEC-which has oversight authority over the SRO
arbitration process-should be increased. But see SEC Budget Plan Dropped, N.Y.
Times, Nov. 23, 1989, at D6, col. 5; SEC Prods Wall Street to Police Its Own Neighbor-
hood, Wall St. J., Nov. 27, 1989, at Cl, col. 3.
403. See supra notes 397-401.
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lected foreign sites for the hearing of arbitration cases:40 4
How would the independent forum be funded? It cannot and
should not be funded merely by increasing user fees, for that would
render arbitration prohibitively costly."° The independent forum
could be financed with a fee imposed on each transaction, or with a
combination of a transaction fee and a reasonable user fee.4°6 In any
event, economies of scale should make a unified forum more cost effi-
cient than the aggregate costs of competing SRO forums.
A single independent forum entails exactly what it indicates-a fo-
rum independent from actual, inferential, subtle, practical or any
other kind of imaginable pressure. The forum should be independent
of the industry, independent of the plaintiff's bar, and other than the
SEC's general oversight role, independent of that regulatory body.
Similarly, individual arbitrators and the forum staff must be free from
such influences or pressures. Just as the increased caseload, 4°7 more
complex cases,408 and new post-McMahon Code amendments4 9
placed new demands upon the abilities and skills of the arbitrators,410
so too has the stress upon the SRO staffs been commensurately in-
creased. Training and retaining experienced staff personnel, there-
fore, is essential. In this connection, experienced staff personnel at the
SROs could help staff the independent forum. Indeed, for the sake of
economy, even some present SRO facilities could be used. The impor-
tant thing is that the forum be governed by an independent
management.41'
404. See Morris, supra note 333, at 114. Moreover, suppose a foreign investor had his
account churned by an account executive in the foreign office of a New York brokerage
firm. To require a hearing sight in New York could in certain circumstances impose an
undue hardship on the customer. See The SEC's New World Role, ECONOMIST, Jan. 6,
1990, at 73. See generally Grass, Internationalization Of The Securities Trading Markets,
9 HOUSTON J. INT. LAW 17 (1986).
405. See Katsoris I, supra note 12, at 385; Hoblin I, supra note 19, at 5. The SEC, in
discussing an SRO's increase in arbitration fees, commented:
[w]e intend to monitor the future administration of this rule closely. Costs to
investors for SRO arbitration historically have been low, and must remain so.
The application of these fees should not be permitted to operate in a manner
that weights too heavily on individual parties or serves as a disincentive to pur-
suing the redress of investors' grievances against broker-dealers or their associ-
ated person.
SEC Release No. 34-26805, supra note 401, at 43.
406. Id.
407. See supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text.
408. See supra notes 328-33 and accompanying text.
409. See supra notes 89-268 and accompanying text.
410. See supra notes 342-50 and accompanying text.
411. For a discussion of a tentative organizational structure of the single forum, see
Unified Arbitration Forum Under Discussion, supra note 392, at 2. Moreover, the SROs
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Where would the AAA fit into the world of a single independent
securities arbitration forum? That would be the AAA's decision if it
wanted to compete in this new atmosphere. However, without subsi-
dization and SEC oversight, the AAA is not the answer to the sepa-
rate independent forum.4" 2
Furthermore, in the process of creating an independent forum we
also have the opportunity to explore jurisdictional improvements,4 13
as well as eliminate inconsistent rules and interpretations among the
various SROs.4" 4 Moreover, this single forum should also offer medi-
ation services, on a voluntary basis, in an attempt to resolve disputes
before incurring the cost and expense of a formal arbitration
proceeding.41 5
It is also important to note that an independent forum would not
require, and should not result in, any major revisions to the Code of
Arbitration, Procedures Booklet, or Arbitrator's Manual. These are
already intended to achieve a level playing field, and except for modi-
fications dictated by hands-on experience, they should remain largely
intact. Indeed, the greatest challenge in creating an independent fo-
rum will be avoiding the temptation to load the Code with procedures
such as mandatory opinions,4 16 or broadening the grounds for ap-
peals4"' that will transform arbitration into a clone of courtroom liti-
gation. Such a transformation would defeat the attributes of
might still wish to continue to maintain separate arbitration forums to service their mem-
ber to member disputes. A concept somewhat analogous to the independent forum has
proved workable in the accounting field. In fact, since 1977, some of the trustees of the
Financial Accounting Foundation (FAF) have been selected by electors outside the ac-
counting profession. See FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD, STATUS RE-
PORT No. 68, at 2 (June 21, 1978). The FAF appoints, oversees and finances the
Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB), which is responsible for formulating the
rules by which companies account and report their financial condition. Id. at 1-2; see
HORNGREN, INTRODUCTION TO FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING 57-58 (2d ed. 1984).
412. See supra notes 369-89 and accompanying text; see also Single Forum Backed,
supra note 375.
413. As to jurisdictional improvements, see Hoblin I, supra note 19, at 3-4; see also
supra note 34 regarding national service of process.
414. See supra notes 272-80 and accompanying text.
415. The NASD has recently embarked on a pilot program of mediation in securities
arbitration cases in conjunction with the AAA or the United States Arbitration and Me-
diation, Inc. Moreover, the single unified forum would be better able to establish and
implement procedures for the more efficient handling of the long and complex case which
would require many, many sessions. See SIA Press Release to Standard & Poor's News
Service (Dec. 21, 1989) (available at Fordham Urban Law Journal office); see also Single
Forum Backed, supra note 375; D. Shannon, Rent-A-Judge, American Way, Feb. 1, 1990,
at 33, col. 1. See generally Silberman, Breaking the Mold of Grievance Resolutions: Pilot
Program in Mediation, 44 THE ARB. J. 40 (1989).
416. See supra notes 229-33 and accompanying text.
417. See supra note 234 and accompanying text.
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arbitration that make it attractive-its speed and economy.418
VI. Conclusion
During the Dickens period, many investors-so essential to the
health of our securities markets-have lost faith in the markets.41 9
Rebuilding that faith will take time and much effort. Essential to the
rebuilding of such confidence is assuring the public investor that when
he has a justifiable grievance against his broker, it will be resolved
swiftly, cheaply, and fairly.42° The McMahon decision virtually man-
dated procedures to guarantee such attributes and the public is enti-
tled to no less. 421
Indeed, McMahon provided both the opportunity and impetus to
make the necessary adjustments to the arbitration process. Reason-
able people may differ as to the specific ground rules, but in striving to
achieve a level playing field for all participants-claimants as well as
respondents-SICA has tried to avoid populist, expedient and short-
term approaches which would strip arbitration of its principal attrib-
utes of speedy justice and economy. Consequently, despite its short-
comings,422 SICA has acted as a constructive force in the creation of
the level playing field, and should continue to independently discuss,
amend and monitor the Uniform Code of Arbitration.
Whether we retain the status quo, or move to a separate independ-
entforum, the SEC should continue in its oversight role.423 To prop-
418. See supra notes 79-83 and accompanying text.
419. See supra notes 2-9 and accompanying text.
420. See Katsoris I, supra note 12, at 386.
421. See Shearson/American Express v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 228 (1987).
422. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
423. If a separate forum is created, Congressional approval for an SEC oversight role
might be necessary. See Single Forum Backed, supra note 375. Moreover, Congress
might also use this opportunity to examine the extent of SIPC (Securities Investor Protec-
tion Corporation), protection in customer/broker disputes involving fraud. See § 3 of
Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 26,657. For exam-
ple, let us assume customer A deposits $50,000 in cash to open an account with an intro-
ducing broker X, who in turn clears through a clearing broker Y. Broker X-without any
authorization-purchases speculative stocks on margin in A's account. When A discov-
ers the unauthorized purchases, A rejects the trades and immediately institutes an SRO
arbitration against broker X. In the meantime, the price of the unauthorized shares
drops dramatically and the clearing broker Y sells out A's account because of margin
requirements resulting from the recent unauthorized purchases, leaving an equity balance
in A's account of only $20,000 instead of the original $50,000. Shortly thereafter, broker
X files for bankruptcy and the SRO suspends the arbitration proceeding.because of the
exclusivity of the bankruptcy proceedings. X is hopelessly insolvent rendering A's claim
against him virtually worthless. Should A's account be protected by SIPC to the extent
of only $20,000 (reduced liquidated value) or $50,000 (original value)? Should the an-
swer change if X was also the clearing broker? Furthermore, should it make any differ-
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erly do this, however, its budget in turn must be supplemented, and
not trimmed.424 You get what you pay for, and the SEC, in its crucial
oversight role, is clearly no exception to this rule.
In striving to keep the playing field level, one must also examine the
sidelines. Thus, the industry should take measures to prevent injury
from occurring in the first piace. For example, brokerage firms, when
filling out new account forms should, after the form is filled out, get
the customer's approval and written confirmation of the key customer
data contained therein, particularly that which pertains to items such
as income levels, equity, investment goals and prior investment expe-
rience. Moreover, if there is an arbitration clause in the customer's
agreement, it should be separately initialled by the customer as well as
the firm.4 26 Better supervision of customers' accounts should also be-
come a matter of top priority, particularly where risky investments
are involved.427 Such a tightening of back office procedures could pre-
vent some of the damage and misunderstanding that exists between
the public investor and the securities industry.428
Congress should also look beyond the boundaries of the playing
field in seeking better investor protection by adopting measures that
will lessen potential losses. Congress can do this by passing legisla-
tion which could improve and stabilize the investment climate. In the
present environment, the small investor has been terrified by the wild
market gyrations that have characterized the Dickens years.4 29 Con-
gress' goal should be to reestablish the rule that the principal purpose
ence if the nature of A's claim against X was for churning or unsuitability, instead of
unauthorized trading?
424. See supra note 402.
425 Such a form is generally filled out by the account executive and approved by his
or her manager.
426. See supra note 264 and accompanying text. It is regrettable that the SEC does not
support the concept of special initialling. See SEC Release No. 34-26805, supra note 401,
at 48.
427. There are many examples of instances which by their virtue should require addi-
tional supervision, but of particular concern are trading in such items as index futures,
naked shorts, illiquid shelters, etc., especially where they involve accounts of elderly in-
vestors or those of limited means.
428. See Mills, Avoiding Arbitration, 1989 SECURITIES ARBITRATION, PLI SEMINAR,
932-34; see also Krebsbach & Friedman, Securities Arbitration: Defending a Brokerage
Firm, 1989 SECURITIES ARBITRATION, PLI SEMINAR 813, 820. Nor is a practice of
tying analysts' bonuses to stock sales likely to instill trust in the public. See Are Analysts
Putting Their Mouths Where the Money Is?, Bus. WK., Dec. 18, 1989, at 118. "Such
payment schemes 'could go a long way towards showing that the investment was not
suitable for the client involved,' says Theodore G. Eppenstein, a New York securities
lawyer." Id.
429. See supra notes 2-5 and accompanying text; see also Small Investors Tiptoe Back
To Wall St., Bus. WK., Aug. 14, 1989, at 99.
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for investing in the markets is not to gamble, but to raise capital for
sound investment.430 This requires a re-examination of the competing
interests of program trading, with a view toward recognizing its legiti-
mate goals, but limiting or eliminating its disasterous side effects.4 31
Bottom line, however, program trading, regardless of its usefulness to
institutional investors, cannot be left unbridled so as to continue to
undermine the primary investment and fund-raising functions of our
capital markets.
Similarly, Congress should consider several tax amendments that
would also improve and stabilize the investment climate, such as: (1)
reestablishing the deduction for Individual Retirement Accounts
(IRAs),4 32 so as to induce savings by and provide a retirement nest
egg for its taxpayers;4 33 (2) re-creating some differential for capital
430. If you cannot bet at the track on credit, why do we allow futures traders to oper-
ate on a 5% margin? It is an unconscionable example of misregulation courting disaster.
See A Pox on Program Trading, supra note 6, at 18, 20; The Quiet Crusader, Bus. WK.,
Sept. 18, 1989, at 80; see also The Purpose ofAmerica' Capital, Barrons, Nov. 20, 1989, at
10 (statement of John J. Phelan, Jr.); Impact of Program Trading Assessed, Advest Inves-
tor Journal, Dec. 1989, at 1, col. 1. "It has been suggested that margin requirements be
raised from 5% to the 50% level required of individual investors and that program trad-
ers be required to comply with the uptick rule, which prohibits short selling when the last
price of a security was below that of the prior transaction." Id.; see also A "Neanderthal"
Speaking, Forbes, Dec. 25, 1989, at 164, col. 1; More Power to the Regulators, N.Y.
Times, Mar. 18, 1990, § 3 (Business), at 13, col. 2. "[W]e must move quickly and force-
fully to bring regulatory oversight of the stock-index futures markets under a single
agency." Id.
431. See Market Re-Maker, Barrons, Dec. 11, 1989, at 14, col. 2.
We have to make a decision. For whom does the market exist? For traders or
for investors? Does it exist for the players in the market or does it exist for the
capital formation process? Modern, up-to-date, sensible regulation that doesn't
ban program trading, doesn't ban new technologies, but accommodates it to the
legitimate needs of the marketplace, is what is needed.
Id. at 15; see also Program Trading Hits the Nikkei, N.Y. Times, Feb. 25, 1990, § 3
(Business), at 15, col. 4; Japan's Market Wrestle With Issue of Volatility, N.Y. Times,
Mar. 1, 1990, at D2, col. 1; U.S. Brokers Asked In Japan to Curb Program Trading, Wall
St. J., Mar. 8, 1990, at C9, col. 1. On the other hand, Congress should not expect the
securities industry to police itself. See NYSE's Call for Restraint Draws Jeers, Wall St. J.,
Nov. 6, 1989, at Cl, col. 3; Bear, Stearns Will Resume Index Arbitrage For Itself, N.Y.
Times, Dec. 13, 1989, at DI, col. 1. "In explaining yesterday's decision, the firm pointed
to a lack of progress by legislators or regulators in introducing corrective measure to
reduce volatility. In particular, the firm said it seemed unlikely that margin requirements
on financial futures would be raised, a step the firm has publicly endorsed." Id.; Nomura
to Enter Program Trading-With Global Aim, Wall St. J., Mar. 13, 1990, at Cl, col. 3; see
also Heavy Program Trading Disclosed by Big Board, Wall St. J., Dec. 19, 1989, at C14,
col. 3; Programs Accounted for 56% of Dec. 15 Big Board Volume, Wall St. J., Dec. 29,
1989, at C13, col. 2. To its credit, the NYSE has recently proposed to curb some of the
volatility caused by program trading. See Big Board Proposes Program Trade Curbs, Wall
St. J., Feb. 14, 1990, at CI. col. 5.
432. See I.R.C. § 408 (1986).
433. See Banks, Why George Bush Wants to Bring IRAs Back, Forbes, Aug. 21, 1989,
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gains, so as to attract venture capital;434 and, most importantly, (3)
granting some relief against the double taxation of corporate profits,
so as to relieve the unfair bias toward borrowed capital as opposed to
equity capital.435 It would be unfortunate indeed if such stabilizing
incentives are denied as a result of budget infighting.4 36
at 68; Persuading Americans To Save, N.Y. Times, Dec. 17, 1989, at 1, col 6; see also Mr.
Bush's Piggy Bank (Editorial), N.Y. Times, Feb. 1, 1990, at A22, col. 1.
434. See generally Katsoris, In Defense of Capital Gains, 42 FORDHAM L. REV. 1,
(1973); Capital-Gains Compromise, Review and Outlook, Wall St. J., July 28, 1989, at
A10, col. 1; To Aid The Poor, Cut Capital Gains Taxes, N.Y. Times, July 25, 1989, at
A23, col. 2; Capital Pains on Capital Gains, U.S. News & World Rep., Aug. 7, 1989, at
42, col. 1. As to capital gains, if all income is taxed the same, then why should an inves-
tor take a short term risk for the sake of long term appreciation? See Market Place, Tax
Laws Spur Borrowing Boom, N.Y. Times, Dec. 28, 1989, at D8, col. 1. Such philosophy
will ultimately deny this nation the long term risk capital necessary to prod innovation
which is essential in order to keep it competitive in a world economy. Moreover, capital
gains taxation is strictly a one-sided proposition when personal assets (i.e., homes, boats,
automobiles, etc.) are involved. If sold at a profit, a capital gains tax must be paid; yet, if
there is a loss, it is not recognized because it is personal in nature. See Katsoris, supra, at
6. In addition, capital gains are taxed when realized, but there is a limitation on the
deductibility of recognized capital losses. Id.; see I.R.C. § 1211 (1986).
435. See Katsoris, The Double Jeopardy of Corporate Profits, 29 BUFFALO L. REV. 1
(1980). As to the effect of the double taxation of corporate profits, every corporate execu-
tive in this country knows that it is cheaper taxwise to raise money through borrowing
than through equity financing. This is so, because the interest on the debt is tax deducti-
ble to the corporation, whereas the dividends on its equity capital are not. This unequal
treatment lays the groundwork for the tilting of companies' balance sheets in favor of
debt over equity. It has created an atmosphere that has encouraged the recent flurry of
LBO's that are made possible through the issuance of high yield debt. See supra note 7;
see also Market Place, Tax Laws Spur Borrowing Boom, N.Y. Times, Dec. 28, 1989, at
D8, col. 1. Certainly the government does not benefit from such debt-ladened takeovers;
for, the acquired corporations were previously generally paying income taxes, whereas
the acquirer may now deduct the interest on the takeover debt from its tax bill. See Big
Shortfall in Corporate Taxes Thwarts Key Goal of 1986 Law, N.Y. Times, Mar. 6, 1990, at
1, col. 1. Such scenario becomes even more unsettling when one contemplates what will
happen to that debt once an inevitable downturn occurs in the economy. See Wall Street
Prepares For a Failure Boom, N.Y. Times, Dec. 31, 1989, § 3, at 2, col. 3; Small Firms
Too, Are Feeling The Chills of Debt Fever, Wall St. J., Feb. 5, 1990, at B1, col. 3; 'Junk
Bond' Prices Fall On Worry Over Drexel, N.Y. Times, Feb. 13, 1990, at D24, col. 1. We
must give relief to this punitive double tax and restore a legitimate balance between eq-
uity and debt. This will have a stabilizing effect upon our markets. See Treasury to Form
Plan to Halt 'Double Taxation,' Wall St. J., Dec. 12, 1989, at A6, col. 3.
436. Let us also now consider the worst case scenario and assume arguendo that all of
these worthwhile tax changes-IRA deduction, capital gains differential and double taia-
tion relief-will ultimately reduce tax revenues. In that case, we must consider them in
light of the nagging national budget deficit and seek to neutralize any such drain; and, if
increased revenues are needed, it has been suggested:
In listing revenue enhancers, I would like to employ some sort of fair, yet prac-
tical, pain index. Thus, at the outset I would first propose an increase in user.
fees and sin taxes-even though I smoke an occasional cigar and on occasion
enjoy a dry martini. In the event such user tax increases are not enough, I
would then retain the 33% maximum individual tax rate on income instead of
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As far as the playing field itself is concerned, should Congress over-
rule the McMahon decision? Such a step makes little or no sense, and
in the long run, neither investors nor the industry would benefit.
Throwing thousands of cases back to congested court calendars is cer-
tainly not the answer.437 In such a scenario, the securities industry
would be plagued by excessive litigation costs, which directly or indi-
rectly, would be borne by the public as the industry's cost of doing
business.43 s In addition, the public would often be denied justice, be-
cause of the excessive costs and delays associated with courtroom liti-
gation.43 9 The decision of whether or not to arbitrate, however,
should be made freely by the customer; but once so agreed, that agree-
ment should be binding.'
Finally, once we achieve a level playing field, we must insure that
this field remains level, for in a less than perfect world, "[laws and
institutions are constantly tending to gravitate. Like clocks, they
must be occasionally cleansed, and wound up, and set to true
reverting back to 28% after a certain income threshold was reached (§ l(g)
IRC). Next, I would impose an oil import tax first and then, if necessary, a
gasoline tax.
If all that were still not enough, I would not otherwise raise income tax rates;
but, instead would consider some sort of national Value Added Tax. I have
read many articles about some of the drawbacks of such a tax; but, on balance,
it has some distinct advantages. For one thing, it addresses the number one
problem of our tax system-the escaping of billions of dollars of revenue
through our underground economy. This "might" even be helpful in detecting
and/or combatting crime. Furthermore, if it is oppressive against the poor, it
can be tailored to give relief through a system of exemptions or credits, such as
the earned income credit (§ 32 IRC).
Letter from Constantine N. Katsoris to the Hon. Lloyd Bentsen, Chairman of the Senate
Finance Committee (Jan. 25, 1989) (discussing capital gains and the double taxation of
corporate profits) (copy on file in Fordham Urban Law Journal Office); see also Live!
Stupid Budget Tricks!, Newsweek, Oct. 23, 1989, at 29, col. 1; A Wake-up Call for Rosty,
Bus WK., Mar. 26, 1990, at 32.
437. See New Tactics in the War on Drugs Tilt Scales of Justice Off Balance, N.Y.
Times, Dec. 29, 1989, at Al, col. 1. "'We're becoming drug courts,' says Edward R.
Becker, a Federal appeals judge in Philadelphia .... 'The short of it is that we're getting
an enormous volume of drug cases, and its making it very difficult in many jurisdictions
to hear civil cases.'" Id.; see also The Federal Courts Have a Drug Problem, Bus. WK.,
Mar. 26, i990, at 76; Drastic Moves Urged to Ease US. Court's Load, N.Y. Times, Mar.
23, 1990, at B5, col. 3.
Indeed, in California, the Los Angeles County Bar Association filed suit in federal
court to appoint more state court judges because it takes about five years for a civil case
to come to trial. See Marcotte, L.A. County Bar Sues California, A.B.A.J., 28 (1988); see
also Lawsuits in Federal Courts, N.Y. Times, July 16, 1987, at B6, col. 6; see also Congress
Now Considering Dispute Resolution Measures, Nat. L.J., Feb. 5, 1990, at 1, col. 1.
438. See Katsoris I, supra note 12, at 374-75.
439. For a discussion of how increased costs deny justice, see supra notes 79-81 and
accompanying text.
440. See supra notes 27-30 and accompanying text.
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time." 44 To insure against such a drift, as well as for the sake of
public perception,442 uniformity in the implementation of the Code," 3
and most importantly, the problem of escalating costs, 4" the time to
consider an independent forum is at hand.445 Indeed, if the securities
arbitration "system was created today, no one would propose the Hy-
dra that now exists. ' 446
441. H. BEECHER, LIFE THOUGHTS 129 (1858).
442. See supra notes 394-96 and accompanying text.
443. See supra notes 272-80 and accompanying text.
444. See supra notes 397-406 and accompanying text.
445. See supra notes 390-93 and accompanying text.
446. Hoblin I, supra note 19, at 3.
[Vol. XVII
1990] SECURITIES ARBITRATION
Appendix A
Arbitration Cases Handled by SROs
American Stock Exchange, Inc. National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc.
ToW. Cm Public T-1I C... Public
To', Cool.ded s,.0 S-l1 C.o-n Aword, Tool Concluded S,-1) S. Cutom Awards
Cm ha~h.bg a., ains C..., to F.- Ce Iocludwog Cms, Col Ca, in Fao
Year Receied So,,enr Recejved Cocluded oded 06 Ye,, y_ co setdm l Reed ConclDdod [kcn of Mbhlic
1980 45 41 18 I 35 16 1980 318 234 134 113 122 56
1981 39 40 7 II 42 22 1981 422 422 142 177 242 118
1982 37 31 9 4 16 10 1982 606 435 157 139 276 140
1983 41 42 14 8 10 6 1983 768 549 216 147 272 161
1994 69 53 16 14 45 26 194 1.108 747 298 244 381 196
1983 64 38 21 14 41 24 193 1.400 962 377 250 434 232
986 63 60 20 28 31 14 1986 1.587 1,199 390 327 476 248
1987 92 74 34 24 41 24 1987 2.986 1.625 458 327 642 364
1988 1D0 63 21 29 27 12 1989 3.990 2,169 1,084 539 934 432
C a cariod imo1989: 87 Cass c.oid io 1989: 4.00
Boston Stock Exchange, Inc.
T C- Pubic
T0.0 C.Wod So.al Sr Co-,.,., Aw.ard
C_ I ohdmg Ch, am, C-e, to F.-
Y. Omaod So rm R iv-d CoWodd d o(l 0pub9 c
1980 2 2 2 2 2 0
1981 2 2 2 2 0 0
1982 I
1983 2 2 2 2 2
1984 0 0 0 0 0 0
1985 0 0 0 0 0 0
1986 2 2 2 2 2 0
1997 0 0 0 0 0 0
1989 0 0 0 0 0 0
C m caried io 1989:0
Chicago Board Options Exchange, Inc.
Tool C.-e bri
Tool Cnocld.d Sma.l Smn11 Comer A.rds
C... n cluding Claims a-,s C... to F.-
Ye.s Recid Saod6mnt ,R.nm, Concluded Deoded of P04i
1980 44 31 II 11 19 6
991 41 32 10 8 12 3
1982 50 38 6 6 14 3
1983 75 45 3 4 13 6
1984 91 56 24 16 4 3
1595 64 38 10 5 0 0
1986 72 44 16 9 12 9
1987 130 93 29 33 22 9
1988 149 89 22 27 48 12
C.-es.ord io. 1989. 151
Midwest Stock Exchange, Inc.
ToC -Public
T..l Concde Sm1 S-,11 Cuo-,, Awards
C.e clding Clam Cl , C-, i. F.-.o
Ye.r Rm..,d Setfld-m R.-d Coocludoel Dfrd of Pubic
1980 2 2 1 0 1 I
1981 2 2 0 0 0 0
1982 I 0 0 0 0 0
1983 2 2 0 0 0 0
1984 1 0 0 0 0 0
1983 I 0 0 0 0 0
1986 4 0 I 0 0 0
1987 5 3 I i I I
1988 I 7 0 0 0 0
C.,s. Mrd in.o 1989: 2
Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board
To-1l C., Public
Totl Conluded Sm1 Sma,1 Coer Awod,
C... Ic1h.iing Cla, Claim, C.e- i F.o
Year Rooood Sd-went R-ive.o Coocdud1 Decded of 96bhc
1980 21 21 7 7 3 2
1981 25 25 5 5 7 4
1982 33 16 7 7 13 6
1983 78 40 17 9 14 5
1994 113 80 20 17 34 21
1905 91 118 31 35 34 31
1906 82 89 30 21 30 15
1987 16 90 38 34 42 24
19088 113 126 49 32 63 37
C-.oied no. 1989: 39
New York Stock Exchange, Inc.
To1 C.., pub6i
Tool Co lrdudd S601 Sm.01 C1ofm Awards
C.-. Ichdi.g CAm , am C.a.s i. F.o
Year Re.0eied Sd.oel Rm.ved Condcuded Decided of Publi
1980 367 327 131 10 221 119
191 477 433 117 134 214 IIl
1 592 58 473 109 113 214 118
1983 713 332 136 122 276 137
194 1008 796 176 183 259 113
1985 1.095 962 198 190 424 221
1986 965 1,04 181 205 432 210
1987 1.050 1,004 225 204 378 200
1988 1,623 1,16 263 235 440 228
C.., c.nd to 1989:1.269
Pacific Stock Exchange, Inc.
Tota1 C.-se P.Mbl,
Tool Conctudd Sm.1l Small C--m,, Award,
C.-e 1-1uding Claims Clai.s 'a. in F.v
Year Receied S.U, R-ived Condod DC.,Ldd f puhlic
1900 24 21 12 I1 4 3
1981 24 20 17 17 9 5
1982 31 21 15 II 10 7
1993 33 29 17 17 23 10
1984 45 26 21 I1 10 7
1985 so 40 12 18 20 12
1986 41 37 9 13 18 9
1987 64 58 27 II 23 13
1988 99 77 30 40 45 20
C.-e carded ioo 1989:986
Philadelphia Stock Exchange, Inc.
'Tool C.-e Foblic
To.a1 Concuded S-.
11  
Sn1 C--t~or Award,
C-se. lncuding Cims Cli., C.. to F.o..
Yo., Receied So-d¢rnen Rocivd C,.Ided Decided of Pblic
1980 7 0 16 4 4 2
1901 10 6 6 3 6 I
1982 23 15 Is II 14 8
1983 17 19 9 I1 12 5
1984 14 7 6 4 3 0
1985 31 19 15 8 8 2
1986 22 13 10 6 7 2
1987 25 13 15 9 4 I
1988 24 13 4 8 4 2
C.-e c..red ino 1989; 42
Composite Arbitration Figures
ToW Cs,, Publc
Total Cncluded Smrnd Sn-0l Cuo.-,r Aw.ard
Cae Including CW-m CW',i Ca.s i. F.-o
Yeor Receivd Sede-o R vedio Cocluodod Doidod of NbE,
1990 830 686 332 269 410 205
1991 1.042 999 306 357 332 264
1982 1,340 1.044 322 292 339 293
1983 1,731 1.259 416 320 622 331
1994 2,449 1,762 561 49 736 366
1985 2.796 2.190 664 320 961 330
1986 2,838 2.460 657 610 1,017 53
1987 4,358 2,958 827 641 1.153 636
1988 6.101 3.740 1,473 930 1.361 743
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL
Appendix B
UNIFORM CODE OF ARBITRATION
SECTION 1.
Arbitration
(a) Any dispute, claim or controversy between a (customer or
nonmember) and a (member, allied member, member organization,
and/or associated person) arising in connection with the business of
such (member, allied member, member organization and/or associ-
ated person) in connection with his activities as an associated person
shall be arbitrated under the Constitution and Rules of the (name of
self-regulatory organization) as provided by any duly executed and
enforceable written agreement or upon the demand of the customer or
nonmember.
(b) Under this Code, the (name of self-regulatory organization)
shall have the right to decline the use of its arbitration facilities in any
dispute, claim, or controversy where-having due regard for the pur-
poses of the (name of self-regulatory organization) and the intent of
this Code-such dispute, claim, or controversy is not a proper subject
matter for arbitration.
SECTION 2.
Simplified Arbitration
(a) Any dispute, claim, or controversy, arising between a public
customer(s) and an associated person or a member subject to arbitra-
tion under this Code involving a dollar amount not exceeding $10,000
exclusive of attendant costs and interest, shall upon demand of the
customer(s), or by written consent of the parties, be arbitrated as
hereinafter provided.
(b) The Claimant shall file with the Director of Arbitration an
executed Submission Agreement and a copy of the Statement of
Claim of the controversy in dispute and the required deposit, together
with documents in support of the Claim. Sufficient copies of the Sub-
mission Agreement and the Statement of Claim and supporting docu-
ments shall be provided to the Director of Arbitration for each party
and the arbitrator. The Statement of Claim shall specify the relevant
facts, the remedies sought, and whether a hearing is demanded.
(c) The Claimant shall deposit the sum of $15 if the amount in
controversy is $1,000 or less, $25 if the amount in controversy is more
than $1,000 but does not exceed $2,500, $100 if the amount in contro-
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versy is more than $2,500 but does not exceed $5,000, or $200 if the
amount in controversy is more than $5,000 but does not exceed
$10,000 upon filing of the Submission Agreement. The final disposi-
tion of this sum shall be determined by the arbitrator.
(d) The Director of Arbitration shall endeavor to serve promptly
by mail or otherwise on the Respondent(s) one (1) copy of the Sub-
mission Agreement and one (1) copy of the Statement of Claim.
Within twenty (20) calendar days from receipt of the Statement of
Claim, Respondent(s) shall serve each party with an executed Submis-
sion Agreement and a copy of Respondent's Answer. Respondent's
executed Submission Agreement and Answer shall also be filed with
the Director of Arbitration with sufficient copies for the arbitrator(s)
along with any deposit required under the schedule of fees. The An-
swer shall designate all available defenses to the Claim and may set
forth any related Counterclaim and/or related Third-Party Claim the
Respondent(s) may have against the Claimant or any other person. If
the Respondent(s) has interposed a Third-Party Claim, the Respon-
dent(s) shall serve the Third-Party Respondent with an executed Sub-
mission Agreement, a copy of Respondent's Answer containing the
Third-Party Claim, and a copy of the original Claim filed by the
Claimant. The Third-Party Respondent shall respond in the manner
herein provided for response to the Claim. If the Respondent(s) files a
related Counterclaim exceeding $10,000, the arbitrator may refer the
Claim, Counterclaim, and/or Third-Party Claim, if any, to a panel of
three (3) or more arbitrators in accordance with Section 8 of this
Code, or he may dismiss the Counterclaim and/or Third-Party
Claim, without prejudice to the Counterclaimant(s) and/or Third-
Party Claimant(s) pursuing the Counterclaim and/or Third-Party
Claim in a separate proceeding. The costs to the Claimant under
either proceeding shall in no event exceed $200.
(e) All parties shall serve promptly by mail or otherwise on all
other parties and the Director of Arbitration, with sufficient copies for
the arbitrators, a copy of the Answer, Counterclaim, Third-Party
Claim, or other responsive pleading, ,if any. The Claimant, if a coun-
terclaim is asserted against him, shall within ten (10) calendar days
either (i) serve on each party a reply to any Counterclaim, or, (ii) if
the amount of the Counterclaim exceeds the Claim, shall have the
right to file a statement withdrawing the Claim. If the Claimant with-
draws the Claim, the proceedings shall be discontinued without preju-
dice to the rights of the parties.
(f) The dispute, claim, or controversy shall be submitted to a sin-
gle arbitrator knowledgeable in the securities industry selected by the
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Director of Arbitration. Unless the public customer demands or con-
sents to a hearing, or the arbitrator calls a hearing, the arbitrator shall
decide the dispute, claim, or controversy solely upon the pleadings
and evidence filed by the parties. If a hearing is necessary, such hear-
ing shall be held as soon as practicable at a locale selected by the
Director 6f Arbitration.
(g) The Director of Arbitration may grant extensions of time to
file any pleading upon a showing of good cause.
(h) The arbitrator shall be authorized to require the submission of
further documentary evidence as he, in his sole discretion, deems
advisable.
(i) Upon the request of the arbitrator, the Director of Arbitration
shall appoint two (2) additional arbitrators to the panel that shall de-
cide the matter in controversy.
(j) In any case where there is more than one (1) arbitrator, the
majority will be public arbitrators.
(k) In his discretion, the arbitrator may, at the request of any
part, permit such party to submit additional documentation relating
to the pleadings.
(1) Except as otherwise provided herein, the general arbitration
rules of the (name of self-regulatory organization) shall be applicable
to proceedings instituted under this Code.
SECTION 3.
Hearing Requirements- Waiver of Hearing
(a) Any dispute, claim, or controversy, except as provided in Sec-
tion 2 (Simplified Arbitration), shall require a hearing unless all par-
ties waive such hearing in writing and request that the matter be
resolved solely upon the pleadings and documentary evidence.
(b) Notwithstanding a written waiver of a hearing by the parties,
a majority of the arbitrators may call for and conduct a hearing. In
addition, any arbitrator may request the submission of further
evidence.
SECTION 4.
Time Limitation Upon Submission
No dispute, claim or controversy shall be eligible for submission to
arbitration under this Code if six (6) years have elapsed from the oc-
currence or event giving rise to the act or the dispute, claim, or con-
troversy. This section shall not extend applicable statutes of
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limitations, nor shall it apply to any case that is directed to arbitration
by a court of competent jurisdiction.
SECTION 5.
Dismissal of Proceedings
At any time during the course of an arbitration, the arbitrators
may, either upon their own initiative or at the request of a party, dis-
miss the proceeding and refer the parties to the remedies provided by
law. The arbitrators shall, upon the joint request of the parties, dis-
miss the proceedings.
SECTION 6.
Settlements
All settlements submitted shall be at the election of the parties.
SECTION 7.
Tolling of Time Limitation(s) for the Institution of Legal
Proceedings
(a) Where permitted by law, the time limitation(s) that would
otherwise run or accrue for the institution of legal proceedings shall
be tolled when a duly executed Submission Agreement is filed by the
Claimant(s). The tolling shall continue for such period as the (name
of self-regulatory organization) shall retain jurisdiction upon the mat-
ter submitted.
(b) The six (6) year time limitation upon submission to arbitration
shall not apply when the parties have submitted the dispute, claim, or
controversy to a court of competent jurisdiction. The six (6) year
time limitation shall not run for such period as the court shall retain
jurisdiction over the matter submitted.
SECTION 8.
Designation of the Number of Arbitrators
(a)(1) In all arbitration matters involving public customers and
nonmembers where the matter in controversy exceeds $10,000, or
where the matter in controversy does not involve or disclose a money
claim, the Director of Arbitration shall appoint an arbitration panel
that shall consist of no less than three (3) arbitrators, at least a major-
ity of whom shall not be from the securities industry, unless the public
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customer or nonmember requests a panel consisting of at least a ma-
jority from the securities industry.
(2) An arbitrator will be deemed as being from the securities
industry if he or she:
i. Is a person associated with a member, or broker-dealer, gov-
ernment securities broker, government securities dealer, municipal se-
curities dealer, or registered investment adviser, or
ii. Has been associated with any of the above within the past
three (3) years, or
iii. Is retired from any of the above, or
iv. Is an attorney-accountant, or other professional who de-
voted twenty (20) percent or more of his or her professional work
effort to securities industry clients within the last two years.
(3) An arbitrator who is not from the securities industry shall be
deemed a public arbitrator. A person will not be classified as a public
arbitrator if he or she has a spouse or other member of the household
who is a person associated with a registered broker, dealer, municipal
securities dealer, government securities broker, government securities
dealer, or investment adviser.
(b) Composition of Panels
The individuals who shall serve on a particular arbitration panel
shall be determined by the Director of Arbitration. The Director of
Arbitration may name the chairman of each panel.
SECTION 9.
Notice of Selection of Arbitrators
The Director of Arbitration shall inform the parties of the arbitra-
tors' names, employment histories for the past ten (10) years, as well
as information disclosed pursuant to Section 11, at least eight (8) busi-
ness days prior to the date fixed for the first hearing session. A party
may make further inquiry of the Director of Arbitration concerning
an arbitrator's background. In the event that prior to the first hearing
session, any arbitrator should become disqualified, resign, die, refuse,
or otherwise be unable to perform as an arbitrator, the Director of
Arbitration shall appoint a replacement arbitrator to fill the vacancy
on the panel. The Director of Arbitration shall inform the parties as
soon as possible of the name and employment history of the replace-
ment arbitrator for the past ten (10) years, as well as information dis-
closed pursuant to Section 11. A party may make further inquiry of
the Director of Arbitration concerning the replacement Arbitrator's
background and, within the time remaining prior to the first hearing
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session or the five (5) day period provided under Section 10, which-
ever is shorter, may exercise its right to challenge the replacement
arbitrator as provided in Section 10.
SECTION 10.
Challenges
In any arbitration proceeding, each party shall have the right to one
peremptory challenge. In arbitrations where there are multiple
Claimants, Respondents, and/or third-Party Respondents, the Claim-
ants shall have one peremptory challenge, the Respondents shall have
one peremptory challenge, Ind the Third-Party respondents shall
have one peremptory challenge, unless the Director of Arbitration de-
termines that the interests of justice would best be served by awarding
additional peremptory challenges. Unless extended by the Director of
Arbitration, a party wishing to exercise a peremptory challenge must
do so by notifying the Director of Arbitration in writing within five
(5) business days of notification of the identity of the persons named
to the panel. There shall be unlimited challenges for cause.
SECTION 11.
Disclosures Required by Arbitrators
(a) Each arbitrator shall be required to disclose to the Director of
Arbitration any circumstances that might preclude such arbitrator
from rendering an objective and impartial determination. Each arbi-
trator shall disclose:
(1) Any direct or indirect financial or person interest in the
outcome of the arbitration.
(2) Any existing or past financial, business, professional, family
or social relationships that are likely to affect impartiality or that
might reasonably create an appearance of partiality or bias. Persons
requested to serve as arbitrators should disclose any such relation-
ships that they personally have with any party or its counsel, or with
any individual whom they have been told will be-a witness. They
should also disclose any such relationship involving members of their
families, or their current employers, or their current employers' part-
ners or business associates.
(b) Persons who are requested to accept appointment as arbitra-
tors should make a reasonable effort to inform themselves of any in-
terests or relationships described in paragraph (a) above.
(c) The obligation to disclose interests, relationships, or circum-
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stances that might preclude an arbitrator from rendering an objective
and impartial determination described in subsection (a) hereof is a
continuing duty that requires a person who accepts appointment as an
arbitrator to disclose, at any stage of the arbitration, any such inter-
ests, relationships, or circumstances that arise, or that are recalled or
discovered.
(d) Prior to the commencement of the first hearing session, the
Director of Arbitration may remove an arbitrator based on informa-
tion disclosed pursuant to this section. The Director of Arbitration
shall also inform the parties of any information disclosed pursuant to
this section if the arbitrator who disclosed the information is not
removed.
SECTION 12.
Disqualification or Other Disability of Arbitrators
In the event that any arbitrator, after the commencement of the
first hearing session but prior to the rendition of the award, should
become disqualified, resign, die, refuse, or otherwise be unable to per-
form as an arbitrator, the remaining arbitrator(s) may continue with
the hearing and determination of the controversy unless such continu-
ation is objected to by any party within five (5) days of notification ,of
the vacancy on the panel. Upon objection, the Director of Arbitra-
tion shall appoint a new member to the panel to fill any vacancy. The
Director of Arbitration shall inform the parties as soon as possible of
the name and employment history for the past ten (10) years of the
replacement arbitrator, as well as information disclosed pursuant to
Section 11. A party may further ask the Director of Arbitration
about the replacement arbitrator's background and, within the time
remaining prior to the next scheduled hearing session or the five (5)
day period provided under Section 10, whichever is shorter, may exer-
cise its right to challenge the replacement arbitrator as provided in
Section 10.
SECTION 13.
Initiation of Proceedings
Except as otherwise provided herein, an arbitration proceeding
under this Code shall be instituted as follows:
(a) Statement of Claim
The Claimant shall file with the Director of Arbitration an exe-
cuted Submission Agreement, a Statement of Claim together with
[Vol. XVII
SECURITIES ARBITRATION
documents in support of the claim, and the required deposit. Suffi-
cient additional copies of the Submission Agreement and the State-
ment of Claim and supporting documents shall be provided to the
Director of Arbitration for each party and each arbitrator. The State-
ment of Claim shall specify the relevant facts and the remedies
sought. The Director of Arbitration shall endeavor to serve promptly
by mail or otherwise on the Respondent(s) one (1) copy of the Sub-
mission Agreement and one (1) copy of the Statement of Claim.
(b) Service and Filing with the Director of Arbitration
For purposes of the Code of Arbitration Procedure, service may be
effected by mail or other means of delivery. Service and filing are
accomplished on the date of mailing either by first-class postage pre-
paid or by means of overnight mail service or, in the case of other
means of service, on the date of delivery. Filing with the Director of
Arbitration shall be made on the same date as service.
(c) Answers-Defenses, Counterclaims, and/or Cross-Claims
(1) Within twenty (20) business days from receipt of the State-
ment of Claim, the Respondent(s) shall serve each party with an exe-
cuted Submission Agreement and a copy of Respondent(s) Answer.
An executed Submission Agreement and Answer of the Respon-
dent(s) shall also be filed with the Director of Arbitration with suffi-
cient additional copies for the arbitrator(s), along with any deposit
required under the schedule of fees. The Answer shall specify all
available defenses and relevant facts that will be relied upon at the
hearing. It also may set forth any related Counterclaim the Respon-
dent(s) may have against the Claimant, any Cross-Claim the Respon-
dent(s) may have against any other named Respondent(s), and any
Third-Party Claim against any other party or person based upon any
existing dispute, claim, or controversy subject to arbitration under
this Code.
(2)(i) A Respondent, Responding Claimant, Cross-Claimant,
Cross-Respondent, or Third-Party Respondent who pleads only a
general denial as an answer may, upon objection by a party, in the
discretion of the arbitrators, be barred from presenting any fact or
defenses at the time of the hearing.
(ii) A Respondent, Responding Claimant, Cross-Claimant,
Cross-Respondent, or Third-Party Respondent who fails to specify all
available defenses and relevant facts in such party's answer may, upon
objection by a party, in the discretion of the arbitrators, be barred
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from presenting such facts or defenses not included in such party's
answer at the hearing.
(iii) A Respondent, Responding Claimant, Cross-Claimant,
Cross-Respondent, or Third-Party Respondent who fails to file an an-
swer within twenty (20) business days from receipt of service of a
claim, unless the time to answer has been extended pursuant to para-
graph (5), may, in the discretion of the arbitrators, be barred from
presenting any matter, arguments, or defenses at the hearing.
(3) Respondent(s) shall serve each party with a copy of any
Third-Party Claim. The Third-Party Claim shall also be filed with
the Director of Arbitration with sufficient additional copies for the
arbitrator(s), along with any deposit required under the schedule of
fees. Third-Party Respondent(s) shall answer in the manner provided
for response to the Claim, as provided in (1) and (2) above.
(4) The Claimant shall serve each party with a reply to a Coun-
terclaim within ten (10) business days of receipt of an Answer con-
taining a Counterclaim. The reply shall also be filed with the Director
of Arbitration with sufficient additional copies for the arbitrator(s).
(5) The Director of Arbitration may extend any period in this
section (whether such be denominated as a Claim, Answer, Counter-
claim, Cross-Claim, Reply, or Third-Party pleading).
(d) Joining and Consolidation-Multiple Parties
(1) Permissive Joinder. All persons may join in one action as
claimants if they assert any right to relief jointly, severally, or in the
alternative in respect of or arising out of the same transaction, occur-
rence, or series of transactions or occurrences and if any question of
law or fact common to all these parties will arise in the action. All
persons may be joined in one action as respondents if there is asserted
against them jointly, severally, or in the alternative, any right to relief
in respect of or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or
series of transactions or occurrences and if any question of law or fact
common to all respondents will arise in the action. A claimant or
respondent need not be interested in obtaining or defending against all
the relief demanded. Judgment may be given for one or more of the
claimants according to their respective rights to relief, and against one
or more respondents according to their respective liabilities.
(2) In arbitrations where there are multiple Claimants, Re-
spondents and/or Third-Party Respondents, the Director of Arbitra-
tion shall be authorized to determine preliminarily whether such
parties should proceed in the same or separate arbitrations. Such de-
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terminations will be considered subsequent to the filing of all respon-
sive pleadings.
(3) The Director of Arbitration shall be authorized to deter-
mine preliminarily whether claims filed separately are related and
shall be authorized to consolidate such claims for hearing and award
purposes.
(4) All final determinations with respect to joining, consolida-
tion, and multiple parties under this subsection shall be made by the
arbitration panel.
SECTION 14.
Designation of Time and Place of Hearings
The time and place for the initial hearing shall be determined by
the Director of Arbitration and each hearing thereafter by the arbitra-
tors. Notice of the time and place for the initial hearing shall be given
at least eight (8) business days prior to the date fixed for the hearing
by personal service, registered, or certified mail to each of the parties
unless the parties shall, by their mutual consent, waive the notice pro-
visions under this section. Notice for each hearing, thereafter, shall
be given as the arbitrators may determine. Attendance at a hearing
waives notice thereof.
SECTION 15.
Representation by Counsel
All parties shall have the right to representation by counsel at any
stage of the proceedings.
SECTION 16.
Attendance at Hearings
The attendance or presence of all persons at hearings, including
witnesses, shall be determined by the arbitrators. However, all parties
to the arbitration and their counsel shall be entitled to attend all
hearings.
SECTION 17.
Failure to Appear
If any of the parties, after due notice, fails to appear at a hearing or
any adjourned hearing session, the arbitrators may, in their discretion,
proceed with the arbitration of the controversy. In such cases, all
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awards shall be rendered as if each party had entered appearance in
the matter submitted.
SECTION 18.
Adjournments
(a) The arbitrators may, in their discretion, adjourn any hear-
ing(s) either on their own initative or on the request of any party to
the arbitration.
(b) A party requesting an adjournment after arbitrators have been
appointed shall, if an adjournment is granted, deposit a fee, equal to
the initial deposit of forum fees for the first adjournment and twice
the initial deposit of forum fees, not to exceed $1,000, for a second or
subsequent adjournment requested by that party. The arbitrators
may waive the deposit of this fee or in their awards may direct the
return of the adjournment fee.
(c) Upon receiving a third request consented to by all parties for
an adjournment, the arbitrators may dismiss the arbitration without
prejudice to the Claimant filing a new arbitration.
SECTION 19.
Acknowledgement of Pleadings
The arbitrators shall acknowledge to all parties present that they
have read the pleadings filed by the parties.
SECTION 20.
General Provision Governing a Pre-Hearing Proceeding
(a) Requests for Documents and Information
The parties shall cooperate to the fullest extent practicable in the
voluntary exchange of information to expedite the arbitration. Any
request for documents or other information should be specific, relate
to the matter in controversy, and afford the party to whom the re-
quest is made a reasonable period of time to respond without interfer-
ing with the time set for the hearing.
(b) Document Production and Information Exchange
(1) Any party may serve a written request for information or
documents ("information request") upon another party twenty (20)
business days or more after service of the Statement of Claim by the
Director of Arbitration or upon filing of the Answer, whichever is
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earlier. The requesting party shall serve the information request on
all parties and file a copy with the Director of Arbitration. The par-
ties shall endeavor to resolve disputes regarding an information re-
quest. Such efforts shall be set forth in the objection.
(2) Unless a greater time is allowed by the requesting party,
information requests shall be satisfied or objected to within thirty (30)
calendar days from the date of service. Any objection to an informa-
tion request shall be served by the objecting party on all parties and
filed with the Director of Arbitration.
(3) Any response to objections to information requests shall be
served on all parties and filed with the Director of Arbitration and
within ten (10) calendar days of receipt of the objection.
(4) Upon the written request of a party who does not receive
the sought information the matter will be referred by the Director of
Arbitration to either a pre-hearing conference under paragraph (d) of
this section or to a selected arbitrator under paragraph (c) of this
section.
(c) Pre-Hearing Exchange
At least ten (10) calendar days prior to the first scheduled hearing
date, all parties shall serve on each other copies of documents in their
possession and shall identify witnesses they intend to present at the
hearing. The arbitrator(s) may exclude from the arbitration any doc-
uments not exchanged or witnesses not identified. This paragraph
does not require service of copies of documents or identification of
witnesses that parties may use for cross-examination or rebuttal.
(d) Pre-Hearing Conference
(1) Upon the written request of a party, an arbitrator, or at the
discretion of the, Director of Arbitration, a pre-hearing conference
shall be scheduled. The Director of Arbitration shall set the time and
place of a pre-hearing conference and appoint a person to preside.
The pre-hearing conference may be held by telephone conference call.
The presiding person shall seek to achieve agreement among the par-
ties on any issues that relate to the pre-hearing process or to the hear-
ing including, but not limited to, the exchange of information,
exchange or production or documents, identification of witnesses,
identification and exchange of hearing documents, stipulations of
facts, identification and briefing of contested issues, and any other
matters that will expedite the arbitration proceedings.
(2) Any issues raised at the pre-hearing conference that are not
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resolved may be referred by the Director of Arbitration to a single
member of the Arbitration Panel for decision.
(e) Decisions by Selected Arbitrator
The Director of Arbitration may appoint a single member of the
Arbitration Panel to decide all unresolved issues referred to under this
section. Such arbitrator shall be authorized to act on behalf of the
panel to issue subpoenas, direct appearance and production of docu-
ments, and set deadlines. Decisions under this paragraph shall be
made based on the papers submitted by the parties, unless the arbitra-
tor calls a hearing. The arbitrator may elect to refer any issue under
this paragraph to the full panel.
(f) Subpoenas
The arbitrator(s) and any counsel of record to the proceeding shall
have the power of the subpoena process as provided by law. All par-
ties shall be given a copy of the subpoena upon its issuance. The par-
ties shall produce witnesses and present proofs to the fullest extent
possible without resort to the subpoena process.
(g) Power to Direct Appearance and Production of Documents
The arbitrator(s) shall be empowered without resort to the sub-
poena process to direct the appearance of any person employed by or
associated with any member or member organization of the self-regu-
latory organization and/or the production of any records in the pos-
session or control of such persons or members. Unless the
arbitrator(s) directs otherwise, the party requesting the appearance of
a person or the production of documents under this section shall bear
all reasonable costs of such appearance and/or production.
SECTION 21.
Evidence
The arbitrators shall determine the materiality and relevance of any
evidence proffered and shall not be bound by rules governing the ad-
missibility of evidence.
SECTION 22.
Interpretation of the Code
The arbitrators shall be empowered to interpret and determine the
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applicability of all provisions under this Code. This interpretation
shall be final and binding upon the parties.
SECTION 23.
Determinations of Arbitrators
All rulings and determinations of the panel shall be [by] a majority
of the arbitrators.
SECTION 24.
Record of Proceedings
A verbatim record by stenographic reporter or tape recording of all
arbitration hearings shall be kept. If a party or parties to a dispute
elect to have the record transcribed, the party or parties making the
request shall bear the cost of such transcription unless the arbitrators
direct otherwise. The arbitrators may also direct that the record be
transcribed. If the record is transcribed at the request of any party, a
copy shall be provided by the arbitrators.
SECTION 25.
Oaths of the Arbitrators and Witnesses
Prior to the commencement of the first session, an oath or affirma-
tion shall be administered to the arbitrator(s). All testimony shall be
under oath or affirmation.
SECTION 26.
Amendments
(a) After the filing of any pleadings, if a party desires to file a new
or different pleading, such change must be made in writing and filed
with the Director of Arbitration. The Director of Arbitration shall
endeavor to serve promptly by mail or otherwise upon all other par-
ties a copy of said change. The other parties may, within ten (10)
business days from the receipt of service, file a response with the Di-
rector of Arbitration.
(b) After a panel has been appointed, no new or different plead-
ings may be filed except for a responsive pleading as provided for in
(a) above or with the panel's consent.
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SECTION 27.
Reopenings of Hearings
Where permitted by law, the hearings may be reopened by the arbi-
trators on their own motion or in the discretion of the arbitrators
upon application of a party at any time before the award is rendered.
SECTION 28.
Awards
(a) All awards shall be in writing and signed by a majority of the
arbitrators or in such manner as is required by law. Such awards may
be entered as a judgment in any court of competent jurisdiction.
(b) Unless the law directs otherwise, all awards rendered pursu-
ant to this code shall be deemed final and not subject to review or
appeal.
(c) The Director of Arbitration shall endeavor to serve a copy of
the award:
(i) by registered or certified mail upon all parties or their coun-
sel, at the address of record; or
(ii) by personally serving the award upon the parties; or
(iii) by filing or delivering the award in such manner as may be
authorized by law.
(d) The arbitrator(s) shall endeavor to render an award within
thirty (30) business days from the date the record is closed.
(e) The award shall contain the names of the parties, a summary
of the issues in controversy, the damages and/or other relief re-
quested, the damages and/or other relief awarded, a statement of any
other issues resolved, the names of the arbitrators, and the signatures
of the arbitrators concurring in the award.
(f) Summary information contained in the awards shall be made
publicly available in accordance with the policies of the sponsoring
self-regulatory organization.
(g) In addition, arbitrators may award interest as they deem ap-
propriate. All awards shall bear interest from the date of the award
until payment at the legal rate, if any, then prevailing in the state
where the award was rendered, or at a rate set by the arbitrator(s) in
the award.
(h) All monetary awards shall be paid within thirty (30) days of
receipt unless a motion to vacate has been filed with a court of compe-
tent jurisdiction.
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SECTION 29.
Agreement to Arbitrate
This Code shall be deemed a part of and be incorporated by refer-
ence in every agreement to arbitrate under the Constitution and Rules
of the (name of the SRO) including a duly executed Submission
Agreement.
SECTION 30.
Schedule of Fees for Customer Disputes
(a) At the time of filing a Claim, Counterclaim, Third-Party
Claim, or Cross-Claim, a party shall deposit with the self-regulatory
organization the amount indicated below unless such deposit is specif-
ically waived by the Director of Arbitration.
Amount in Dispute Deposit
(Exclusive of interest and expenses)
$1,000 or less ................................................ $15
Above $1,000 but not exceeding $2,500 ....................... $25
Above $2,500 but not exceeding $5,000 ....................... $100
Above $5,000 but not exceeding $10,000 ...................... $200
Above $10,000 but not exceeding $50,000 .................... $400
Above $50,000 but not exceeding $100,000 ................... $500
Above $100,000 but not exceeding $500,000 .................. $750
A bove $500,000 ............................................. $1000
When the amount in dispute is $10,000 or less, no additional depos-
its shall be required despite the number of hearing sessions. When the
amount in dispute is above $10,000 and multiple hearing sessions are
required, the arbitrators may require any of the parties to make addi-
tional deposits for each additional hearing session. In no event shall
the aggregate amount deposited per hearing session exceed the
amount of the initial deposit(s) as set forth in the above schedule.
(b) A hearing session is any meeting between the parties and the
arbitrator(s), including a pre-hearing conference, which lasts four (4)
hours or less.
(c) The arbitrators, in their awards, may determine the amount
chargeable to the parties as forum fees (fees) and shall determine who
shall pay such fees.
When the amount in dispute is $10,000 or less, total fees chargeable
to the parties shall not exceed the amount of the total initial deposit
deposited by the parties, regardless of the number of hearing sessions
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conducted. When the amount in dispute is above $10,000, fees
chargeable to the parties per hearing session may equal but shall not
exceed the amount of the total initial deposit(s) made by the parties.
Amounts deposited by a party shall be applied against fees, if any.
If the fees are not assessed against a party who had made a deposit,
the deposit will be refunded. In addition to forum fees, the arbitra-
tor(s) may determine in his awards the amount of costs incurred pur-
suant to Secctions 18, 20, and 25 and, unless applicable law directs
otherwise, other costs and expenses of the parties and arbitrator(s)
that are within the scope of the agreement of the parties or otherwise
is permitted by law. The arbitrator(s) shall determine who shall pay
such costs.
(d) If the dispute, claim, or controversy does not'involve or dis-
close a money claim, the amount to be deposited by the Claimant
shall be $300, or such amount as the Director of Arbitration or the
panel [ofi arbitrators may require, but shall not exceed $1,000.
(e) In any matter settled or withdrawn Within eight (8) business
days prior to the first scheduled hearing session, the SRO may retain
the amount deposited as forum fees or a portion thereof. This section
shall not apply to (small) claims filed under Section 2 of this Code.
(f) Any matter submitted and thereafter settled, or withdrawn
subsequent to the commencement of the first hearing sessions may be
subject to such refund of assessed deposits, if any, as the panel of
arbitrators presiding may determine.
(g) The arbitrators may assess forum fees and costs incurred pur-
suant to Section 18, 20, and 25 in any matter settled or withdrawn
subsequent to the commencement of the first sessions.
(h) The fee for pre-hearing conferences shall be 75 percent of the
fees contained in subsection (a).
SECTION 31.
Requirements When Using Pre-Dispute Arbitration Agreements with
Customers
(1) Any pre-dispute arbitration clause shall be highlighted and
shall be immediately preceded by the following disclosure language
(printed in outline form as set forth herein) that shall also be
highlighted:
(a) Arbitration is final and binding on the parties.
(b) The parties are waiving their right to seek remedies in court
including the right to jury trial.
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(c) Pre-arbitration discovery is generally more limited than
and different from court proceedings.
(d) The arbitrator's award is not required to include factual
findings or legal reasoning and any party's right to appeal or to seek
modification of rulings by the arbitrators is strictly limited.
(e) The panel or arbitrators will typically include a minority of
arbitrators who were or are affiliated with the securities industry.
(2) Immediately preceding the signature line, there shall be a
statement that shall be highlighted and separately initialed by the cus-
tomer that the agreement contains a pre-dispute arbitration clause.
The statement shall also indicate at what page and paragraph the ar-
bitration clause is located.
(3) A copy of the agreement containing any such clause shall be
given to the customer who shall acknowledge receipt thereof on the
agreement or on a separate document.
(4) No agreement shall include any condition that limits or con-
tradicts the rules of any self-regulatory organization or limits the abil-
ity of a party to file any claim in arbitration or limits the ability of the
arbitrators to make any award.
(5) The requirements of this section shall apply only to new agree-
ments signed by an existing or new customer of a member or member
organization after 120 days have elapsed from the date of Commission
approval of this rule.
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